Advancing the Language of Human Rights in a Global Economic Order: An Analysis of a Discourse by Ochoa, Christiana
Boston College Third World Law Journal
Volume 23 | Issue 1 Article 3
1-1-2003
Advancing the Language of Human Rights in a
Global Economic Order: An Analysis of a
Discourse
Christiana Ochoa
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Third World Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christiana Ochoa, Advancing the Language of Human Rights in a Global Economic Order: An Analysis
of a Discourse, 23 B.C. Third World L.J. 57 (2003), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj/vol23/
iss1/3
ADVANCING THE LANGUAGE OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER: 
AN ANALYSIS OF A DISCOURSE 
CHRISTIANA OCHOA * 
Abstract: Human rights language is particularly attuned to setting out 
the goals of protecting the world's least protected people. As human 
rights advocates have entered negotiations with international economic 
institutions and transnational corporations (TNCs), such negotiations 
have often resulted in an alternative language to describe the necessity 
of protecting and promoting human rights. After describing the 
progressive inclusion of human rights ideas by TNCs, the World Bank, 
the IMF, and the WTO, this Article argues that, while such inclusion is a 
benefit to the human rights movement, the creation of an alternative 
language to describe human rights goals is potentially detrimental. The 
language of human rights, in order to be understood by those it aims to 
protect, must, above all, be intelligible and accessible to them. At this 
early stage of interactions between human rights advocates and 
international economic actors, human rights advocates should retain 
and advance the compelling and utopian language of rights. 
Commerce, however necessary, however lucrative, as it depraves the man-
ners, corrupts the language; they that have frequent intercourse with 
strangers, to whom they endeavor to accommodate themselves, must in time 
learn a mingled dialect. . . . This will not always be confined to the ex-
change, the warehouse, or the port, but will be communicated by degrees to 
other ranks of the people, and be at last incorporated with the current 
speech. 
-Samuel Johnson l 
* J.D., Harvard Law School (1998), B.A., University of Michigan (1993). Christiana 
Ochoa is a past associate of the New York office of the law firm Clifford Chance. She has 
worked as a visiting professor at the University of the Andes in Bogota, Colombia and has 
worked for a number of human rights organizations throughout Latin America. The 
author would like to thank Timothy Lynch, Christiana Zilke, Todd Ochoa, Max Ochoa, 
William Aceves, Erin Han, Kara DeITufo, and Michelle Picheny for their thoughtful com-
ments to this Article. 
1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, SAMUEL JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY: A MODERN SELECTION 25 (E.L. 
McAdam,jr. & George Milne eds., 1964) (1755). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The philosophical origins of human rights as we know them are 
as recent as modernity.2 As such, the community of human rights ad-
vocates is recent, and the language it uses to articulate its demands 
and goals remains in flux. The myriad debates defending or advanc-
ing a particular definition for a specific human rights problem or 
transgressive occurrence abound as evidence of this phenomenon.3 
As with any specialized field of study and work-including law4-hu-
man rights has developed its own "language for a special purpose. "5 
Specialized lexicons have also developed in areas relevant to human 
rights, such as economics, finance, and the phenomenon of globaliza-
tion.6 Moreover, because economics, globalization, and human rights 
are not entirely independent of one another, they experience cross-
pollination of their communities and specialty languages. 
This Article discusses characteristics of two of these discourses, 
that of international economic law and that of human rights, and the 
points of contact between the two. Although they share philosophical 
roots in liberal ideals, human rights and international economic law 
2 See, e.g., Kenneth Minogue, The History of the Idea of Human Rights, in HUM. Rrs. 
READER 3, 3-5 (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 1989). "It is easy enough to give a date 
to inventions like the steam engine, but to say when an idea first became current is much 
more difficult. In trying to detect this moment, we must use the familiar distinction be-
tween the medieval and the modern world." Id. at 5. 
3 For example, the definition of trafficking in women continues to be highly con-
tested. See, e.g., Janie Chuang, Redirecting the Debate over Trafficking in Women: Definitions, 
Paradigms, and Contexts, 11 HARV. HUM. Rrs.]. 65, 65-68 (1998); Stephanie Farrior, The 
International Law on Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution: Making It Live Up to Its 
Potential, 10 HARV. HUM. Rrs.]. 213,214-16 (1997); Susan Jeanne Toepfer & Bryan Stuart 
Wells, The Worldwide Market for Sex: A Review of International and Regional Legal Prohibitions 
Regarding Trafficking in Women, 2 MICH.]. GENDER & L. 83, 91-93 (1994). 
4 See ROBIN TOLMACH LAKOFF, TALKING POWER 102 (1990). 
5 The terms "specialized languages," "professional languages," and "languages for spe-
cial purposes" are used synonymously herein and are the terms used in linguistic studies to 
explain the phenomenon of languages formed by a specific profession to adequately ex-
press the nuances that develop in the pursuit of that profession. 
Language for special purposes is like a microscope in areas where technical 
registers develop. Likewise, only small fragments of reality are made the sub-
ject of discussion, and from a very peculiar viewpoint at that. Yet the vocabu-
lary that is necessary for taking part in such a discussion is far greater than 
the lexicon of general language. 
FLORIAN COULMAS, LANGUAGE AND ECONOMY 276-77 (1992). 
6 See generally KIUANNE ANTiiONY & HENRY LOUIS GATES, THE DICTIONARY OF GLOBAL 
CULTURE 520 (1997) (defining important cultural contributions and traditions from vari-
ous regions around the world). 
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stand as polarized communities, as a result of a decades-long creation 
of separate instruments and institutions.7 This separation, however, 
has never been absolute. In recent decades, human rights actors have 
questioned this separation in the course of examining the idea that 
international economic actors should practice a form of social re-
sponsibility congruent with the body of law developed in the interna-
tional human rights system. Specifically, as human rights advocates 
call into question transnational economic actors and international 
economic institutions, and continue advancing methods to ensure 
accountability of their economically-focused globalized counterparts, 
the two communities come into contact, thus shaping a nexus. 
Part I of this Article, by means of setting out a definition of inter-
national economic law used throughout the Article, discusses the 
separation of private and public international law, as well as the dis-
tinctions between international business law and international eco-
nomic law. After giving a general view of each of these domains, it fo-
cuses more specifically on the institutions and actors in the 
international economic demesne. Part II examines the points of con-
tact between the international economic and human rights communi-
ties. Particularly, it considers the innovations developed by the two 
communities to introduce human rights into the market's space, 
through negotiations and advocacy with transnational corporations 
(TNCs) , and the major international financial institutions: the IMF, 
World Bank and WTO. 
Part III focuses on the professional languages employed in the 
discourse between the economic and human rights communities. 
Specifically, it illustrates that the interaction between an economic 
language and a rights-based language affects both the substance of 
the discourse and the outcome of the interactions between these two 
communities. Part III further argues that the protracted interaction 
and negotiation between economic and human rights advocates cre-
ates an alter-language. Although this alter-language facilitates com-
7 Sec, e.g., Noberto Bobbio, The Great Dichotomy: Public/Private, in DEMOCRACY & DICTA-
'JDRSHIP: THE NATIJRE AND LIMITS OF STATE POWER 2 (Peter Kennealy, trans.); INT'L AsS'N 
OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS, LAW IN THE SERVICE OF PEACE: Two CONCEPTS 39, 45(1963); 
David Kennedy, Receiving the International, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. I, 4-5 (1994); Robert 
Howse & Makau Mutua, Protecting Human Rights il1 a Global Economy: Challenges jor the World 
Trade Organization 'l! 3 (2000), at http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/ 
globalization/wtoRightsGlob.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2002); sec also Morton J. Horwitz, 
The History oj the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1424 (1982) (noting 
how the public/private distinction was brought into the core of legal discussion by the 
evolution of the market as the central legitimating institution). 
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munication, it may result in excessive compromises by rights advo-
cates. Analogizing to historical linguistic patterns of colonization, Part 
III describes the potential dangers of language concessions. It rec-
ommends a conscious delineation of boundaries for human rights 
advocates who are in constant interaction with the transnational eco-
nomic order. This ensures that they do not compromise substance nor 
dilute basic human rights principles through language concessions 
and modifications in the process of negotiations with the interna-
tional economic community. The Article concludes that, in order to 
protect a wide range of potential alternatives for the attainment of 
human dignity, individuals participating in this discourse must con-
sciously aim to retain the powerful utopian ideas couched in human 
rights rhetoric. 
I. THE MARKET'S PLACE 
A. Nothing Is Private: A Definition of International Economic Law 
This Article uses a broad definition of international economic 
law, which includes public international law, international business 
law, international trade law, private international law, and other cate-
gories that influence transnational economic activity and have the po-
tential to impact the advancement and protection of human rights.s 
8 A good example of this broad definition of international economic law is provided 
by Joel R. Paul: 
In its broadest sense, international economic law includes all national and in· 
ternational legal norms that affect transnational movements of goods, servo 
ices, capital and labor. The field may include subjects like international busi· 
ness transactions, private international law, international trade law, 
immigration law, European Communities law, comparative law, transnational 
litigation, international arbitration procedure, and aspects of banking, com-
petition, employment, environmental, intellectual property, securities, tax, 
and telecommunications laws that regulate transnational transactions. 
Joel R. Paul, The New Movements in International Economic Law, 10 AM. UJ. INT'L L. & POL'y 
607, 609 n.9 (1995). Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Foreip;n Relations Law defines Inter-
national Economic Law as "all the international law and international agreements govern-
ing economic transactions that cross state boundaries or otherwise have implications for 
more than one state, such as those involving movement of goods, funds, persons, intangi-
bles, technology, vessels or aircraft." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
Part VIII, Introductory Note at 261 (1987). There is continued debate, however, over 
which components of international law make up this term. Joel P. Trachtman describes 
this debate by delineating arguments for a distinction between international business law 
and international economic law. Under this view, international business law would remain 
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The idea that international law is divided into two distinct realms-
private and public-is widely accepted though highly debated.9 Public 
international law is traditionally referred to as the law governing rela-
tions between nation-states. 1O Public law, though, has commonly been 
defined as the law "dealing with the relations between private indi-
viduals and the government, and with the structure and operation of 
outside of the scope of public international law while international economic law would be 
included within it: 
A related purported distinction between international business law and in-
ternational economic law is the distinction between transactions and trade. 
Transactions, in this sense, are between private persons (or public persons 
treated more or less as private persons), while trade is a matter of public pol-
icy and mercantilism or protectionism. The distinction is one between levels 
of analysis. Analysis at the individual or firm level of economic organization is 
transactional, while analysis at the state or higher level is economic. Because 
the substantive body of law governing the individual is still predominantly 
domestic, this distinction implicates the domestic-international dichotomy. 
Joel P. Trachtman, Introduction: The International Economic Law Revolution, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L 
ECON. L. 33, 38 (1996). These debates use the definition of economic law as a battle-
ground for the debate over what economic activity should be included within the realms of 
public versus private international law. The disagreement reveals that in order to address 
all facets of economic activity, a definition of economic law similar to Joel Paul's and the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law is necessary since the definition Trachtman illus-
trates merely masks and reiterates the private/public distinction. 
9 See Bobbio, supra note 7, at 7, 15-17; Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the 
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1349-57 (1982); Trachtman, supra note 
8, at 34. For example, Joel Trachtman, in commenting on this debate, critiques the 
definition of private international law as follows: 
I note the emptiness of the category "private international law. " Private inter-
national law is not separate from public international law. As many realists 
and critical legal theorists long ago pointed out, "private law" is an oxymoron. 
Rather, the important underlying issue is that there are at least two kinds of 
persons subject to law: private persons and states. The two types of applicable 
law may be quite different. 
Trachtman, supra note 8, at 34. Another exception should be noted. The Secretariat of the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the Subcommission for the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights (formerly the Subcommission for the Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities) asserts that all international law is public inter-
national law. This body insists that any legal instrument, private or public, that involves 
more than one state is a matter of public concern and is therefore a matter of public in-
ternationallaw. Telephone Interview with Tamara Kunanayakam, Human Rights Commis-
sion Secretariat, United Nations, (Aug. 1996) (on file with author). Ms. Kunanayakam is 
currently directing the Working Group on Forced and Involuntary Disappearances under 
the auspices of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in 
Geneva, Switzerland. 
10 LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 45 (3d ed., 
1993). 
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the government itself."l1 Private international law, on the other hand, 
refers to resolutions for conflicts of law and establishes the principle 
of comity for a country's domestic laws in foreign courts.12 It is princi-
pally concerned with resolving conflicts of national law governing 
transactions between individuals, associations, and corporations from 
more than one domestic jurisdiction. 13 
Under a globalizing order that erodes national sovereignty and 
increases the importance of private actors, a clear delineation be-
tween private and public law and their relationship to one another is 
difficult to discern.14 As such, the boundaries between public and pri-
vate international law remain mutable. The increased role of cross-
border transactions, trade, and production has given greater impor-
tance to the economic activities of private actors' parastatal activity.15 
As a result, an inclusive definition of international economic law is 
necessary to discuss the interaction between the international eco-
nomic and international human rights regimes. Specifically, this in-
clusive definition allows for a consideration of all the points at which 
international human rights and international economic law interact. 
Adopting such a definition also permits a discussion of the impacts of 
transnational economic activity on universal observance of human 
rights without requiring a distinction between the public and the pri-
vate. 
B. Objects of C1iticism and Locations for Negotiations: Economic 
Institutions and Transnational Corporations 
Incorporated within the definition of international economic law 
are the range of international economic instruments and institutions 
established at the end of World War II to facilitate a stable and global-
ized liberal economic order.16 International agreements dominate this 
11 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1244 (7th ed. 1999). 
12 "Justice Story coined the term, 'private international law,' to describe the principles 
governing conflicts which he derived from the law of nations." Paul, supra note 8, at 610. 
13 Id.; Trachtman, supra note 8, at 40. 
14 For example, in Economic Order and International Law, Wilhelm Ropke elaborated on 
what he called "[t]he converging interest of the science of international law and of eco-
nomics in the connection between economic order and international law." Wilhelm 
Ropke, Economic Order and International Law, 86 RECUEIL DES COURS 203, 212 (1954). 
15 Paul, supra note 8, at 612-13. 
16 This range of instruments and institutions emerged from the United States' and 
British desire to stem the economic disorder that resulted from the departure of the pre-
World War I gold standard-based monetary system, the ensuing nationalist economic poli-
cies, and the ill-effects of the Great Depression. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1417-18. 
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area and generally cover broad tracts such as international trade, in-
ternational monetary affairs, and international investmentP A skele-
tal overview of the primary participants in international economic law 
is essential for understanding the complexity of the debate that sur-
rounds regulation of transnational economic activity. Transnational 
Corporations and the central international economic institutions are 
among the locations at which transnational activity has been and can 
continue to be influenced by human rights efforts, which demand 
that such economic activity incorporate the basic rights of people. 
At the center of modern international economic legal history is 
the Bretton Woods-GATT system. Named after the 1944 conference 
held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire,ls this international eco-
nomic system arose from the twin goals of stabilizing exchange rates 
in the post war period and ensuring the availability of the long-term 
capital necessary for post World War II reconstruction.19 The Bretton 
Woods Conference developed the framework for the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (the World Bank), and sketched the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-World Trade Organization 
(WTO) system. 
Initial plans for both the World Bank and the IMF were focused 
on reconstruction rather than on development. 2o Advocates from less 
developed nations, however, pushed for a rapid transition from re-
construction to development. They feared that, instead of financing 
development in underdeveloped countries, institutions like the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development would merely 
supplement private investors.21 
17 Id. at 1394. 
18 Some 730 people from forty-four countries-mostly allied nations-attended the 
conference. Victor L. Urquidi, Reconstruction vs. Development: The IMF and the World Bank. in 
BRETTUN WOODS, supra note 28, at 13. 
19 Id. at 4. 
20 Id. at 38-40. 
21 Victor L. Urquidi of Mexico, one such advocate, recalled a talk he gave at the Lit-
tauer School at Harvard University in 1944. 
I began by reminding the audience that ... Latin America ... was well within 
the lowest category of income ... per head in the world, productivity was low, 
and we showed every feature of underdevelopment. W'e needed to raise farm 
productivity and widen our domestic markets as a basis for industrialization, 
for which we required "investment for development purposes, better tech-
nique, and more education." I sawall this as an argument for obtaining for-
eign assistance .... I did not see private investment alone as doing the job, 
given the need for social reforms .... I feared that, unfortunately, the Bank 
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During the period from 1950 to the 1970s, the World Bank estab-
lished the International Development Association (IDA), the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation (IFC), and the training-focused Develop-
ment Institute.22 In addition, the World Bank embarked upon 
research on various issues including agriculture, education, health, 
and urban growth. 23 The World Bank remained outwardly focused on 
the project of reconstruction throughout these early years. By the 
1970s, however, the World Bank underwent an institutional shift to-
wards development by expanding operations and giving substantial 
support to development programs and plans in a number of countries 
in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.24 
During the first decade of the World Bank's institutional shift, 
the IMF remained closed to development issues, holding the position 
that it was established essentially for the purpose of reconstruction.25 
From 1979 to 1985, however, the IMF also underwent an institutional 
shift towards development. It became intensely involved in providing 
loans and designing programs to carry developing country members 
out of debt incurred from increases in oil prices and interest rates in 
the early and mid 1970s.26 Presently, the IMF continues to act in a va-
riety of capacities, including monitoring and controlling the eco-
nomic management of a number of less developed nations.27 
The current international trade law regime originated in con-
junction with, though separate from, the Bretton Woods system. In 
the winter of 1947-1948, the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) organized the U.N. Conference on Trade and 
for Reconstruction and Development (I actually said that "one almost forgets 
to add this word") would place "too little emphasis on development" and that 
its operations "would be mostly to supplement private investors ... instead of 
lending its own money," whereas we were "by no means sure of being able to 
resort to private capital on reasonable terms"; among other things, "investors 
... will be after profits, or lower corporation taxes, but [would not be) inter-
ested in our organic development or industrialization as a whole." 
Id. at 43. 
22Id. 
23 Urquidi, supra note 18, at 47. 
24Id. 
25 The goals of the IMF are set out in Article I of its Articles of Agreement. Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, as amended, Apr. 1, 1978, 29 U .S.T. 2203, 
T.I.A.S. No. 8937. 
26 HENKIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1419. 
27 Irving S. Friedman, The International Monetary Fund: A Founder's Evaluation, in THE 
POLITICAL MORALITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 19 (Robert J. Meyers ed., 
1987). 
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Employment in Havana, Cuba.28 This conference originated in re-
sponse to a number of proposals for a United Nations conference to 
negotiate an international trade charter and establish an Interna-
tional Trade Organization. By the spring of 1948, the conference par-
ticipants established the GATT and a Charter for the International 
Trade Organization (ITO).29 Though the ITO was never accepted by 
the United States and ultimately failed internationally, many of its 
provisions were incorporated into the GATT articles soon after the 
Havana Conference.3o The historical ITO provisions later became the 
foundation for the World Trade Organization (WTO).31 
In addition to the GATT, other major regional instruments pro-
mote the advancement of free trade agreements, either among their 
member nations or between member and non-member states. These 
instruments include the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA),32 the European Economic Community,33 the Mrican Eco-
nomic Community,34 the Latin American regional organizations,35 the 
28 HENKIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1396; Simon Reisman, The Birth of a World Trading 
System: ITO and GATT, in THE BRETTON WooDs-GATT SYSTEM: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 
AFTER FIF'IYYEARS 83-85 (Orin Kirshner ed., 1996) [hereinafter BRETTON WOODS]. 
29 Reisman, supra note 28, at 85. 
so Id. at 85-86. 
81 Id. at 86. 
82 Henkin et al. describe the history of the NAFTA as follows: 
In March, 1985, President Reagan and [Canadian] Prime Minister Mul-
roney asked their trade officials to explore ways to eliminate barriers to trade 
and investment between the United States and Canada. Under Congression-
ally granted "fast track" authority, negotiations began in 1986. The United 
States and Canada reached an agreement on the framework of a free trade 
area in 1987. And on January 1, 1989, the Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement came into effect. 27 I.L.M. 293 (1988) .... The favorable recep-
tion ... moved the member states to open negotiations with Mexico with the 
aim of bringing about a North American Free Trade Agreement. These nego-
tiations led to a signing of an agreement with Mexico at the end of 1992. 
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1547. 
33 For an overview of the history of the European Economic Community and a com-
parison between it and the NAFTA, see John P. Fitzpatrick, Tlze Future of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement: A Comparative Analysis of tlze Role of Regional Economic Institutions and the 
Harmonization of Law in Nortli' America and Western Europe, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 10-23 
(1996). 
S4 See generally Theophilus Fuseini Maranga, The Colonial Legacy and tlze African Common 
Market: Problems and Challenges Facing tlze African Economic Community 10 HARV. BLACKLET-
TER L.J. 105 (1993) (discussing the past and present challenges to the Mrican Economic 
Community as a result of the lingering effects of colonialism). 
!IS These include the Caribbean Community, the Andean Pact Organization, the Latin 
American Integration Association, and the Latin American Free Trade Association and 
MERCOSUR. 
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Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN),36 and the proposed 
Arab Economic Union.37 In addition, a large network of bilateral in-
vestment treaties complicate this regional system of economic agree-
ments. These treaties include bilateral investment guarantee agree-
ments; bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation; and 
bilateral investment treaties for the encouragement and protection of 
foreign investment.38 
Transnational corporations seek and enjoy the stability and pro-
tection provided by these economic institutions and agreements. 
Though largely unregulated by international law, transnational cor-
36 See generally Lim Siong Hoon, Asean Takes First Step to Regional Customs Grouping, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Oct. 9,1991, at 3 (reporting that in October 1991, the member countries 
of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) announced their creation of an 
Asian Free Trade Area, consisting of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singa-
pore, and Thailand, with the objective of creating a single market within 15 years); Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations web site, at http://www.asean.org (last visited Oct. 2, 2002) 
(offering up-to-date information about the status and progress of ASEAN negotiations and 
legal documents). 
37 An International Conference to Study Arab Economic Union, ARABICNEWS.COM, (Novem-
ber 20, 1997) , 2, at http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily /Day/971120/1997112024. 
html (last visited Oct. 2, 2002); see also Mosad Zineldin, Globalisation and Economic Integra-
tion Among Arab Countries, , 5, at http://www.hf.uib.no/smi/pao/zineldin.html(last visited 
Oct. 2, 2002). 
38 HENKIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1394-95. By 1994 developed countries had negoti-
ated over 500 bilateral investment treaties with developing countries. AA Fatouros, To-
wards an International Agreement on Foreign Direct Investment, in ORGANIZATION FOR Eco-
NOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TOWARDS MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT RULES 50 
(1996). Of the over 1,100 treaties listed in a 1999 publication by the World Bank Group's 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, more than 800 had been con-
cluded since 1987 and the list of countries party to such treaties had grown to 155. INT'L 
CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, Introduction to Bilateral Investment Treaties, at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/intro.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002). In May 
1995, the complexity of this web of instruments led the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) to conduct negotiations among OECD member 
states for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAl). The MAl's goal was to "provide a 
broad multilateral framework for international investment with high standards for the 
liberalization of investment regimes and investment protection and with effective dispute 
settlement procedures." .... "After a three-year period of intense and highly contested 
negotiations, lasting until May 1998, and a six-month pause during which no official meet-
ings on the MAl took place, negotiations ceased in December 1998." OECD FINANCIAL, 
FISCAL, AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Documentation from the 
Negotiation. at http://wwwl.oecd.org/daf/mai/intro.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2002). 
For a good introduction to the problem of developing a code of conduct for compa-
nies, see UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, PRINCIPLES RELATING TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONDUCT OF COMPANIES, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/WG.2/WP.l/ (2000); see also HENKIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 
96 (stating that general multinational treaties lay down rules of behavior that are of a 
"fundamen tally norm-creating character" that form the basis for a general rule of law). 
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porations have become important players in the international eco-
nomic system as foreign direct investment continues to increase rap-
idly and transnational corporations grow in number and size. 
Added to the plethora of international institutions and entities 
that are potential objects of criticism and locations for negotiation are 
nation-states. The nation-state retains the power to regulate and de-
regulate the actions of people and corporate entities within its bor-
ders. Multinational agreements remain dependent on the approval of 
nations for legitimacy. If democratic, national governments also hold 
the burden of accountability to their citizens. As the purported repre-
sentative of the people, a national government is an obvious recipient 
of criticism when it negotiates contracts with investors or treaties with 
foreign nations that are contrary to the well being of its populous.39 
Given this complex consortium of economic actors, it is little 
wonder that it has been an arduous task to define the goals of regulat-
ing transnational economic activity to ensure that it does not violate 
the basic rights of people. The following section provides an historical 
overview of the attempts to ensure the observance of human rights by 
transnational economic actors. 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ENCONOMIC LAw: 
ENCOUNTERS 
The negotiations between the human rights community and its 
international economic counterparts have been in progress, in differ-
ing degrees and with diverging levels of success, for over thirty years. 
To illustrate the importance of the language developing from those 
negotiations, Part II first discusses the role of nongovernmental or-
ganizations in the interactions between the human rights community 
and the international economic community. Section B then traces the 
developments of the negotiations between the human rights commu-
nity and TNCs by means of various codes of conduct. Last, Section C 
outlines the general trend of the major international financial institu-
tions towards acknowledging, at least in part, the influence and im-
~9 The debate surrounding NAFTA is a good example of opposition to an interna-
tional trade treaty from large portions of a population. See, e.g., Harry Browne, Green 
Groups, Maturing Relationships, 5 BORDERLINES 31, '11, available at http://www.us-mex.org/ 
borderlines/1997/bI31/bI31gren.html (last visited Nov. 10,2002). For example, there has 
been Canadian opposition to NAFTA. See Iryll Umel, Capital Watch: NAFTA's Drain on Ca-
nadian Sovereignty, WASHINGTON REpORT ON THE HEMISPHERE 15 (Aug. 6, 2001) at 
http://www.coha.org/WRH_issues/21.14-CW-Nafta.htm (last visited Nov. 10,2002). 
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pact of their institutions on the protection and promotion of the 
ideas encompassed by international human rights. 
A. The Voice of Human Rights: The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations 
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are prominent and es-
sential actors in the efforts to ensure the accountability of transna-
tional economic activity. These groups actively, and at times noisily, 
link this economic activity with the observance of human rights. To-
gether with the United Nations and the ILO, they are the primary ad-
vocates and protectors of human rights law and ideas. NGOs have 
contributed tremendously to efforts to draw the attention of interna-
tional economic actors to the compelling nature of human rights and 
their integral importance in long-term, sustainable development. In 
consulting and negotiating with their economic counterparts, how-
ever, it is essential that NGOs remain attentive at all times to the 
specific substantive and linguistic concessions they agree to make with 
economic actors. 
Traditionally, NGOs playa gadfly role by calling attention to abu-
sive labor practices,40 environmental offenses,41 and the marketing of 
products that are known health-hazards.42 Until the late 1990s, how-
ever, human rights NGOs had done little to highlight the need to 
precondition the expansion of transnational economic activity with 
both corporate observance of basic human rights and a commitment 
by all countries active in the global economy to improve their human 
rights records. The 1997 Human Rights Watch World Report was the 
first indication that Human Rights Watch acknowledged transnational 
economic activity as a threat to human rights.43 In its 1998 report, 
40 See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, LATIN AMERICA: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLA-
TIONS AGAINST TRADE UNIONISTS 1-5 (1991); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, PHILIP-
PINES: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT 1-3 (1991). 
41 See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 01-7756L, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 16540, at *1 
(2d Cir. Aug. 16,2002). See discussion infra note 88. 
42 See generally LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & NAT'L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, 
WORKING PAPER: AN INT'L FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS POSED BY INT'L 
TRADE IN BANNED OR SEVERELY RESTRICTED PROD. (1983) (arguing that importing nations 
must give informed consent before they allow banned or severely restricted products to 
enter their territory and concluding that the United Nations must establish a framework 
that would allow every nation to protect its citizenry by mandating such informed consent 
regulations). 
43 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REpORT 1997: EVENTS OF 
1996, at 356-61 (1996) (including an overview of 1996 activist efforts to encourage corpo-
rations to observe labor rights, environmental rights, rights of association and providing 
cursory information on the role of governments in balancing the promotion of human 
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Human Rights Watch noted the emerging importance ofNGO activity 
in promoting corporate practices that comply with universal human 
rights standards.44 By 2001, Human Rights Watch had created a de-
partment on Corporations and Human Rights, included a section on 
Business and Human Rights in its annual report, and employed full 
time staff on this issue.45 
Another NGO, the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights, first 
began to focus on the relationship between international financial 
institutions and the advancement of human rights in 1993.46 Differing 
from many other NGOs, which targeted transnational corporations, 
the Lawyers Committee focused on the responsibility of the World 
Bank in the promotion of human rights.47 Partially as a result of this 
work and the work of other NGOs surrounding the activity of multi-
lateral economic institutions, the World Bank now considers how the 
projects it funds will effect human rights.48 
The proliferation of NGO activity on the issue of human rights 
and trade or human rights and business is impressive. As general fa-
miliarity with this issue has spread and deepened, so the NGOs work-
ing on this issue have mirrored that growth. The challenge ahead is to 
ensure that these groups, while advocating for inclusion of human 
rights concerns, maintain the strong language of rights within their 
institutional rhetoric. 
rights with the desire to attract capital investment). Notably this human rights issue, which 
just the year before had been relegated to the back of this organization's annual report, 
appeared near the front of its 1998 report. In the 1998 report, "Multinational Corpora-
tions" appeared as the third campaign issue after landmines and the establishment of an 
International Criminal Court. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD 
REpORT 1998: EVENTS OF 1997, at 415-22 (1997) [hereinafter WORLD REpORT 1998] (listing 
"Corporations and Human Rights" as the second special issue after "Prisons"). 
44 Id. 
45 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REpORT 2002: EVENTS 
OF 2001, at 564-73 (2002) [hereinafter WORLD REpORT 2002]. 
46 Their first publication on this matter was THE LAWYERS COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, THE WORLD BANK: GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1993). 
47 LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IN THE NAME OF DEVELOPMENT: HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND THE WORLD BANK IN INDONESIA, AJOINT REpORT OF THE LAWYERS COMMIT-
TEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY RESEARCH AND ADVOCACY 1 
(1995) [hereinafter IN THE NAME OF DEVELOPMENT]. Subsequent reports of the Lawyer's 
Committee for Human Rights are also committed to this goal. 
48 Attention from the World Bank and other international financial institutions to 
human rights will be discussed in Part II, Section C. 
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B. Regulating Business Conduct in the Global Economic System: 
Codes of Conduct 
Nongovernmental organizations have had varying degrees of 
success in interacting with the range of international economic actors 
discussed herein. NGOs, together with the United Nations, the ILO, 
and individual governments, have found codes of conduct to be a 
successful means to influence the activities of TNCs. This section de-
tails the differing types of codes of conduct, each with their own set of 
methods and goals, and each with their own potential for effective 
inclusion of human rights within corporations' daily activities. Almost 
all codes of conduct remain entirely voluntary and lack enforcement 
mechanisms. This, among other reasons, may explain the ready in-
corporation of the optimistic language of human rights by many 
TNCs. Nonetheless, they provide a model for maintaining human 
rights language at other points of contact between the human rights 
community and its economic counterparts. 
l. International Institutional Initiatives to Promulgate Codes 
In response to the mobilization efforts of human rights NGOs, 
the United Nations and its individual members have focused on regu-
lating the behavior of non-state actors.49 Private corporations, particu-
larly TNCs, are included within this focus, as they are "some of the 
most significant non-state actors in the world today. "50 As a result, the 
United Nations (U.N.) and other inter-governmental bodies advocate 
developing transnational codes of conduct for TNCs.51 
The United Nations' attempts to create a code of conduct for 
TNCs are varied and numerous. In 1990 the United Nations Centre 
on Transnational Corporations issued a Draft Code of Conduct for 
TNCs.52 Although the Commission on Transnational Corporations 
49 Barbara A. Frey. The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations in the 
Protection of International Human Rights, 6 MINN.]. GLOBAL ThADE 153, 158 (1997). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Center on 
Transnational Corporations, Special Sess. (Mar. 7-18, 1983 and May 9-20, 1983), U.N. 
Doc. E/C.1O/1982/6 (1986) [hereinafter Draft Code]; Draft United Nations Code of Conduct 
on Transnational Corporations, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. Transnational Corporations, Special 
Sess. (June 11-29, 1984), U.N. Doc. E/C.10/1984/s/5 (1984). The mandate to issue this 
Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations was prompted by three factors. First, 
international economic law scholars held that host countries should abide by certain stan-
dards concerning treatment of foreign investors. They believed such standards should be 
enforced at the international level. Second, a widespread demand for some sort of interna-
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agreed on the Draft Code of Conduct, the U.N. member states were 
unable to agree on key provisions "dealing with protection of prop-
erty and contractual rights, compensation in case of taking property, 
and the settlement of disputes. "53 Consequently, the Draft Code of 
Conduct was abandoned.54 In 1996 the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission established a Working Group on the Right to Develop-
ment that re-initiated U.N. activity aimed at establishing a framework 
to hold accountable TNCs that violate human rights standards. 55 
In 1998 the Subcommission for Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities (now the Subcommission for the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights) established the Sessional Working 
Group on the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational Cor-
tional standards of behavior emerged from both concerns that TNCs were interfering with 
the traditional social and cultural objectives of their host countries and evidence of corpo-
rate misconduct, corruption, and interference in internal state matters. Third, rights ad-
vocates and international economic actors alike believed a Code of Conduct was necessary 
in order to assure uniformity, predictability, and accountability. Outstanding Issues in the 
Draft Code o/Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Transna-
tional Corporations, Special Sess. (june 17-21,1985), at 6-7, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/1985/s/2 
(1985). 
55 Gillian White, The New International Economic Order: Principles and Terms, in INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND DEVELOPING STATES 48-49 (Hazel Fox ed., 1992) [hereinafter 
DEVELOPING STATES]. 
54 There is general consensus that there will not be further negotiations on the Draft 
Code. See id. at 49; HENKIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1458. In fact, the Centre on Transna-
tional Corporations no longer exists as an autonomous entity and has been made one part 
of the Transnational Corporations and Management Division of the Division of Economic 
and Social Development of ECOSOC. During the period in which the Centre on Transna-
tional Corporations drafted the Code of Conduct, it had been an autonomous body within 
the U.N. Secretariat. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1454, 1458-59. Importantly, the 
Commission agreed on draft provisions on the recognition of state sovereignty, adherence 
to the cultural and economic imperatives of the host country, and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. Draft Code, supra note 52, "6,9, 12, 13. 
55 This intergovernmental working group of experts had a two-year mandate for its 
work. In 1998, under Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1998/72, the Commission 
on Human Rights established an open-ended Working Group on the Right to Develop-
ment to "monitor and review progress made in the promotion and implementation of the 
right to development as elaborated in the Declaration on the Right to Development." The 
Right to Development, U.N. High Comm. Hum. Rts., Comm. Hum. Rts. Res. 1998/72, ES-
COR, Supp. No.3, at 229, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES./1998/72 (1998). Numerous state-
ments of this body argue that the current concentration of economic and political power 
in transnational corporations stands as an obstacle to the realization of the right to devel-
opment and to achieving equity in resource and income allocation. Declaration on the Right 
to Development, G.A. Res. 128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/41/128 (1986); Report o/the Worning Group on the Right to Development on Its Second 
Session, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. Hum. Rts., 51st Sess., '159, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/1l; 
Report 0/ the Worning Group on the Right to Development on Its First Session, U.N. ESCOR, 
Comm. Hum. Rts., 50th Sess., '191, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/21. 
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porations with the intention of evaluating the propriety of adopting a 
code of conduct for TNCS.56 The Working Group's draft principles on 
the conduct of corporations provide a basis for assessing corporations' 
performance and have the potential to result in either a new U.N. 
standard or global guidelines for the conduct of corporations.57 In 
August 2002, the mandate of this Working Group was extended until 
2004, a clear indication of the Subcommission's continued interest in 
the interaction between human rights and international corporate 
activity. 
In 2000 the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Anan, 
announced the creation of the highly publicized Global Compact, an 
initiative launched with the aim of encouraging corporations to vol-
untarily adopt nine fundamental principles on human rights, labor, 
and environmental protections.58 The Global Compact directly ap-
peals to private corporations to adopt and adhere to principles that 
are already widely accepted by U.N. member states, via the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Labour Organiza-
tion's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 
and the 1992 Rio Declaration of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development.59 
The U.N. is not the only international institution to attempt to 
adopt codes of conduct for TNCs. In 1976 the Organization for Eco-
56 The Relationship Between the Enjoyment of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the 
Right to Development, and the Working Methods of Transnational Corporations, U.N. High Comm. 
Hum. Rts., Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
Res. 1998/8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/1998/8 (1998). 
57 Report of the Sessional Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of Transna-
tional Corporations on its Fourth Session, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. Hum. Rts., Sub-Commission 
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 54th Sess., U.V. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/13 (2002); WORLD REPORT 2002, supra note 45, at 571. 
58 Secretary-General Proposes Global Compact on Human Rights, Labor, Environment 
in Address to World Economic Forum in Davos, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6881/Rev.l * (1990) a-
vailable at http://www.un.org/partners/business/davos.htm (last visited Oct.2, 2002). Most 
interesting about the Global Compact is the Secretary - General's suggestion to the private 
actors that they have the power to encourage sovereign states over which they have 
influence to adhere to the principles of the Global Compact. He also encourages these 
private actors to behave in accordance with the Global Compact, even in locations that 
may not afford these protections to their own people. Id. 
59 See The Global Compact, Overview, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ 
Portal / (last visited Nov. 8, 2002). The overview states that the Global Compact is "based 
on nine principles in the areas of human rights, labour, and the environment." These prin-
ciples are "derived from universal consensus based on" the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, The International Labour Organization's (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, and The Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment. 
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nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states 
adopted a Declaration on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises.5O When the Guidelines were adopted in 1976, they repre-
sented the first international agreement on multinational enterprises 
accepted by both business and labor representatives of the OECD 
member states. As such, they represent an innovative approach to en-
couraging responsible behavior from multinational enterprises.61 
Likewise, the International Labor Organization adopted a code 
of conduct for TNCS.62 Entitled "Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy," the tripar-
tite ILO system requires that the Conference delegation from each 
state party be comprised of two governed representatives, one labor 
60 OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, in THE 
OECD DECLARATION AND DECISIONS ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISES: BASIC TEXTS, 5-6 (Nov. 8, 2000), available at http://www.olis. 
oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nd/c5ce8ffa41835d64c125685d005300bO/c125692700623b74c125 
6991003b5147/$Fll..E/00085743.PDF (last visited Oct. 2, 2002). [hereinafter OECD DEC-
LARATION]. In Annex 1 to that document the member states also adopted Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises. OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, in 
OECD DECLARATION supra, at 7-10 [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. These Guidelines "aim 
to ensure that the operations of [multinational] enterprises are in harmony with govern-
ment policies to strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between enterprises and the 
societies in which they operate .... " Id. at 7. The Guidelines include provisions on "Em-
ployment and Industrial Relations" and "Environment." Id. at 13-16. 
61 At least one proponent of codes, guidelines, and declarations argues that these non-
binding instruments can influence the behavior of governments and enterprises. See Wil-
liam C. Fredrick, The Moral Authority of Transnational Corporate Codes, 10 J. OF Bus. ETHICS, 
165,167 (1991). It is arguable that the Guidelines provide a valuable reference for future 
endeavors of the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations and the efforts of 
the International Labour Organization (ll..0) to draft similar documents. (The ILO 
document will be discussed below.) The Guidelines are largely ineffectual, however. First, 
upon learning that the environmental provisions of the Guidelines were adopted in 1991, 
one may optimistically argue that such a recent addition to the Guidelines indicates that 
they could be modified again to include provisions ensuring that international human 
rights standards are observed by multinational enterprises. OECD Guidelines, supra note 60. 
Although the guidelines were recently clarified, they are unlikely be modified in the near 
future. Second, the Guidelines are voluntary, and there is no indication that OECD mem-
ber-states intend to make corporate or investor adherence to the Guidelines a precondi-
tion of operating within their territory. In fact, this would probably be an express violation 
of current Guideline provisions, which are explicitly intended to be voluntary. Id. at 7. 
Finally, a 1991 decision of the OECD Council clarifies that, in addition to being voluntary, 
the Guidelines are non-enforceable, even against enterprises that commit to observing 
them. Id. at 33-34. 
62 Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and So-
cial Policy was adopted by the ILO on November 16, 1977, at the 204th Session of the ILO 
in Geneva. International Labor Organization Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Mul-
tinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 17 I.L.M. 422 (Nov. 16, 1977). 
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representative, and one representative from the business sector.63 
Though each government chooses its representatives in consultation 
with the country's business community, the employer and the labor 
representatives are theoretically free to take positions that do not con-
form to their government's policy objectives.64 
2. National Campaigns to Establish Codes of Conduct: The Model of 
the United States 
National governments also encourage codes of conduct. The 
United States government, for example, now encourages United 
States-based corporations to adopt codes of conduct to regulate their 
own activity when they establish operations in foreign countries or 
contract with foreign suppliers and producers.65 These types of codes 
aim to regulate corporate activity, as opposed to codes that aim to 
influence the human rights practices of the countries where TNCs are 
active. Codes that aim to influence corporations' human rights prac-
tices propose that businesses interested in countries with poor human 
rights records have a responsibility to act as agents for the protection 
and promotion of human rights in the course of their conduct.66 This 
type of proposal has emerged as the countries that once advocated for 
transnational corporate accountability have become increasingly con-
vinced that development is their primary priority. 
In an atmosphere in which countries view themselves in competi-
tion for capital activity,67 many in the human rights community have 
63 Jonathan I. Charney, Transnational Corporations and Developing Public International 
Law, 1983 DUKE LJ. 748, 778 n.74. 
64 Id. 
65 Douglass Cassel, Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution, 19 FORDHAM 
INT'L LJ. 1963, 1974 (1996). For example, in 1996 the United States Department of 
Commerce issued Model Business Principles. In addition, other campaigns for codes of 
conduct include the No Sweat Campaign launched in 1996 by U.S. Labor Secretary Robert 
Reich; the "Trendsetter" list started by the Labor Department to encourage retailers to 
demonstrate a commitment to U.S. labor laws; and the Apparel Industry Partnership, 
which was also facilitated by the Labor Department. Deborah L. Spar, The Spotlight and the 
Bottom Line: How Multinationals Export Human Rights, 77 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 7, 7-8 (Mar./ Apr. 
1998). 
66 Business leaders who reject suggestions that they should be human rights reformers 
usually defend their positions by insisting that democracy and human rights are promoted 
by free trade rather than regulation of corporate conduct. See Frey, supra note 49, at n.13. 
67 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 38, at 
9. But see PAUL KRUGMAN, POP INTERNATIONALISM 6 (1997). Krugman argues that the be-
lief that one country must compete with all the others as though in a global marketplace 
in order to attract foreign direct investment is flawed. He states: 
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begun arguing that TNCs should act as advocates for human rights in 
the host countries in which they operate.68 It may be possible for the 
United States to prohibit corporations from violating human rights or 
locating in countries that violate human rights in accordance with the 
Restatement (Third) of the F01rign Relations Law of the United States, § 414 
comment C.69 According to the Restatement, subject to certain restric-
tions, "a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to ... 
(l)(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have 
substantial effect within its territory, [and] (2) the activities, interests, 
status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its terri-
tory, "70 except where such jurisdiction is unreasonable.71 More 
specifically, the Restatement explains that a State may prescribe its laws 
extraterritorially "for limited purposes with respect to activities of for-
eign branches of corporations organized under its laws. "72 
A comment to the Restatement seeks to limit permissible extrater-
ritorial regulation by stating that, as a general matter, such laws may 
not be prescribed extraterritorially if they will apply to "predominately 
local activities, such as industrial and labor relations, health and safety 
practices, or conduct related to preservation or control of the local 
environment. "73 This comment appears to prohibit extraterritorial 
application of laws on a wide range of human rights matters. One 
commentator has noted, however, that although bribery-the subject 
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-may be classified as a local ac-
tivity, "the United States' criminalization of bribery abroad may be 
distinguished from the activities listed in Comment c of the Third Re-
statement by the fact that bribery is a simple negative proscription ('do 
not bribe'), whereas the other activities involve extensive positive 
Id. 
In fact, however, trying to define the competitiveness of a nation is much 
more problematic than defining that of a corporation. The bottom line for a 
corporation is literally the bottom line .... Countries, on the other hand, do 
not go out of business. They may be happy or unhappy with their economic 
performance, but they have no well-defined bottom line. As a result, the con-
cept of national competitiveness is elusive. 
68 See, e.g., Cassel, supra note 65. 
69 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 402(1), (2) (1987). 
70 According to the Restatement, a TNC is considered a national of the state under 
whose law it is organized or incorporated. Id. at cmt. e. 
71 Id. at § 403(1). 
72Id. at§ 414(1). 
75 Id. at cmt. c. 
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regulations. "74 Therefore if negative proscriptions are permissible, a 
law could be enacted which simply prohibits corporations from violat-
ing basic human rights or locating in countries that violate the human 
rights treaties of that corporation's home state. 
The United States government has often used its ability to regu-
late transnational economic activity as a method of encouraging for-
o eign governments to comply with basic human rights standards. An-
other method employed by the United States and other nations is the 
use of economic sanctions and embargoes against countries that have 
fallen into disfavor with the U.S.75 The most successful and well-
known example is the United States embargo on trade with and in-
vestment in South Africa during the final years of apartheid in that 
country.76 U.S. use of economic embargoes, however, has recently be-
come unpopular as a result of multilateral economic treaties that 
prohibit such sanctions.77 
74 Joshua P. Eaton, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corpo-
rations, and the Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 15 B.U. INT'L LJ. 261, 280 n.98 
(1997). 
75 Frey states: 
Economic sanctions are a tool used to punish offending governments; these 
sanctions have a direct impact on TNCs doing or seeking to do business in 
these countries. The U.S. Government has sought to extend its influence 
even further in the cases of Cuba, Iran, and Libya, by adopting legislation that 
would penalize non-U.S. businesses that have certain types of investments in 
these rogue states. 
Frey, supra note 49, at 168-69 (citations omitted). 
76 Daniel Schorr, What the World Thinks of 'the Embargo, 'THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONI-
TOR,Jan. 23, 1998, at http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/1998/01 /23/ opin/ colunm.l. 
html (last visited Nov. 8, 2002). 
77 The GATT /WTO system asserts equal treatment of investors and countries in like 
circumstances through Most Favored Nation (MFN) status as one of its fundamental prin-
ciples. The Most Favored Nation provision of the draft documents for the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investments (MAl) provides one historical example of the international 
move to eliminate economic embargoes. OECD, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(Report by the Chairman to the Negotiating Group), Annex 3 art. 2, 13-14 (May 1998), available 
at http://wwwl.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng9817e.pdf(lastvisitedOct.6.2002).Ac-
cording to this provision, once a country grants a certain level of treatment to a foreign 
investor or a foreign investment from a particular country, it cannot then grant less favor-
able treatment to any other investment or investor. This principle of the MAl also would 
have required equal treatment among all target countries. 
The Most Favored Nation provision of the MAl provides a valuable example of a gen-
eral decline in the use of economic or trade sanctions to discourage governments from 
engaging in abusive practices. For a concise discussion of the decline of MFN status and 
the rise of Normal Trade Relations status, see, for example, INTERNATIONAL TRADE DATA 
SYSTEM, NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS (FORMERLY KNOWN AS MOST FAVORED-NATION STATUS 
(MFN», atwww.itds.treas.gov/mfn.html (last updated Mar. 12, 2002). This would prevent 
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3. Private Initiatives to Establish Voluntary Codes of Conduct 
Corporations themselves, under pressure from consumer boy-
cotts, have voluntarily developed and adopted codes of conduct.7B 
There is some evidence that this is a successful strategy for ensuring 
corporate adherence to human rights standards. For example, as a 
result of public pressure, boycotts, or picketing, many large and well-
known corporations such as the Gap, Starbucks Coffee, and Reebok 
have committed to much-improved labor standards and have agreed 
to monitor the labor practices of their sourcing locations.79 
Nonetheless, consumer boycott strategies are an inefficient 
method to achieve high levels of human rights observance. Consumer 
boycotts are only likely to be successful against brand name products 
that are both well known and conveniently replaceable by consumers. 
The voluntary codes of conduct system assumes the brand-driven 
market functions in such a manner that a consumer is actually willing 
and able to replace a favorite brand by one that has not been cited for 
human rights violations. Even promoters of the voluntary codes of 
conduct system admit that observance of human rights issues "is not 
fully decisive in the marketplace."SO Additionally, these strategies de-
pend on access to full and accurate information on corporate activity 
that is often extremely difficult to discern.Bl 
governments from distinguishing between foreign investors or foreign investment targets 
based on countries' human rights practices, labor treatment, or other criteria. It should be 
noted that by denying member states the ability to use economic sanctions and embargoes 
against nations that violate human rights, a valuable method of enforcing human rights 
may be eliminated. See HARVARD HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM, THE MULTILATERAL AGREE-
MENT ON INVESTMENT: A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION 
MECHANISMS (1998) (on file with author) (outlining the human rights norms that would 
have been violated if the MAl had passed). Though not discussed at length herein, a re-
cent article by Barbara Frey provides a comprehensive overview of United States domestic 
actions on regulating its own corporations that extend their business to foreign countries. 
See Frey, supra note 49, at 168-73. These efforts include the codes of conduct initiated at 
the federal level which have already been mentioned in this Article, as well as legislative 
initiatives to regulate the economic activity of transnational enterprises and regulate the 
involvement of United States' corporations in the political affairs offoreign nations. [d. 
78 Examples include Social Accountability International's Social Accountability 8000 
campaign, which aims to encourage firms to adhere to a predetermined set of labor and 
human rights standards by providing them with certification as a SA8000 company if their 
manufacturers pass inspection. SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILI'IY INT'L, AN OVERVIEW OF SAl AND 
SASOOO, at http://www.cepaa.org/introduction.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2002). The success 
of this effort clearly depends on consumer awareness and activism. 
79 See Spar, supra note 65, at 9-10. 
80 [d. at 9. 
81 For example, after the Nike Corporation adopted its Code of Conduct, it disap-
peared from the light of public scrutiny. However, the CEO of Nike has revealed that de-
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Further, it is misleading to assert that these codes of conduct are 
likely to reverse current exploitative trends and actually create a "race 
to the top. "82 Although pressuring corporations to observe basic hu-
man rights standards may improve corporate observance of human 
rights above the deplorable level which inspires consumer boycotts, 
this is a much more modest advance than what one might imagine a 
true race to the top would achieve. 
Distinguished from codes of conduct regulating the corpora-
tion's own human rights practices are codes aiming to influence the 
human rights records of the countries in which a corporation oper-
ates.53 In the first scenario, the best advocacy strategy may be to pro-
mote improvement of the domestic laws regulating corporate activity. 
The international codes mentioned above and the idea of Most Fa-
vored Nation status prohibit differential treatment under the domes-
tic law of any given country between foreign and domestic companies. 
This contributes greatly to what has become known as the "race to the 
bottom." Business enterprises may not be breaking domestic law when 
spite Nike's adoption of a Code of Conduct, which purportedly regulates labor practices of 
all their foreign subsidiaries and producers, the company does not adhere to those prac-
tices. THE BIG ONE (Miramax Pictures 1997). In addition, workers who produce Nike 
products in Jakarta are entirely unaware that Nike has promulgated a Code of Conduct 
and certainly have neither means of reporting accurately and efficiently on Nike's adher-
ence to this code, nor means to enforce it. Id.; see also What Would You Do If You and Seven 
Other Workers at Your Factory Lost Fingers in Dangerous Machinery Because the Factory Owner 
Couldn't Be Bothered to Fix It' Haryanto's Story (Jan. 2000), at 
http://www.caa.org.au/campaigns/nike/haryanto.html(last visited Nov. 9, 2002). 
82 See Spar, supra note 65, at 9-10. In this context, the race to the top suggests that 
companies, in seeking consumer approval and loyalty, compete or race against one an-
other to protect and promote labor and human rights conditions for their workers or the 
environmental conditions in the regions where they work. 
S!! In 1990, in response to Chinese human rights abuses, Reebok announced the fol-
lowing principles: 
1. Reebok will not operate under martial law conditions or allow any military 
presence on its premises. 
2. Reebok encourages free association and assembly among its employees. 
3. Reebok will seek to ensure that opportunities for advancement are based 
on initiative, leadership and contributions to the business, not political be-
liefs. Further, no one is to be dismissed from working at its factories for politi-
cal views or non-violent involvement. 
4. Reebok will seek to prevent compulsory political indoctrination programs 
from taking place on its premises. 
5. Reebok reaffirms that it deplores the use of force against human rights. 
Frey, supra note 49, at 180 n.140 (quoting Diane Orentlicher & Timothy Gelatt, Public Law, 
Private Actors: The Impact of Human Rights on Business Investors in China, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & 
Bus. 66, 108 (1993» (citing Reebok Code of Conduct). 
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they benefit from a country's legal structure that is geared towards 
maximizing profits but does not provide adequate environmental, 
health, or labor protections. These enterprises often operate, how-
ever, in violation of the rights enumerated in the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.84 As a law-abiding 
entity in a country that itself has not become a state party to the 
Covenants or is not fulfilling its obligations under these Covenants, 
such a corporation is shielded from accountability as long as it can 
prove that it did not make any of the key decisions to violate human 
rights in a country that has incorporated human rights laws into its 
domestic legislation.85 At the same time, as long as the U.N. Subcom-
mission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and the 
U.N. Human Rights Commission are reluctant to hold nations ac-
countable for failing to prosecute corporations that violate human 
rights, the likelihood that these violations will escape international 
scrutiny remains high. 
Alternatively, a law could mandate that corporations, in the 
course of conducting their activities abroad, provide the same level of 
protection to human rights, such as labor and environmental rights, 
as mandated in their home countries.86 Such laws might persuade the 
84 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 
1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 
1966,993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into forceJan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
85 See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 01-7756L, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 16540, at *10 
(2d Cir. Aug. 16,2002). The plaintiffs in this case, seeking relief based on Texaco's alleged 
environmental abuse in Equador, filed suit in part under the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(ACTA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789), asserting that Texaco's actions violated international 
law. Id. The plaintiff's legal team convinced the court that if it could prove that Texaco's 
decision to pursue environmental degradation in Ecuador that, if conducted in the United 
States would violate U.S. environmental law, Texaco could not use the procedural defense 
of forum non conveniens to block the litigation against it. Id. In 2001, after six years of 
rehearings and remands, the district court dismissed these actions based on forum non 
conveniens, holding that litigation should proceed in Equador. Aguinda v. Texaco, 142 F. 
Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd as modified, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 16540 (2d. Cir. 
2002). In conducting its forum non conveniens analysis, the district court concluded that 
plaintiffs would be unlikely to demonstrate that Texaco's acts were intentional torts ac-
tionable under the ATCA. Id. at 544. For further information on this and other cases filed 
under the ATCA, see http://www.earthrights.org/litigation/index.html (last updated May 
28,2002). 
86 For a proposal to extend all relevant U.S. environmental regulations to TNC opera-
tions abroad, see Alan Neff, Not in Their Backyards, Either: A Proposal for a Foreign Environ-
mental Practiees Act, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 477 (1990); see also Mitchell F. Crusto, All That Glitters 
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domestic corporations of a given country to improve their standards. 
First, once TNCs are prevented from increasing profits by capitalizing 
on human rights abuses, host-country domestic corporations-that 
currently escape scrutiny-may become the targets of a consumer 
boycott strategy. By analogy, the internationalization of the United 
States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act87 suggests that if countries im-
pose obligations on their own corporations doing business abroad, 
there could be a tendency to universalize the legal norm so as to re-
duce any competitive advantage of corporations not yet constrained 
by such laws. In this instance it must be noted that, in large part, the 
countries with the most powerful corporate interests carry tremen-
dous influence in the realm of international law and policy. 
Mandating corporations to provide the same level of protection 
to human rights as in their home countries could, however, place 
western corporations at a disadvantage in the global market by allow-
ing corporations originating in nations without human rights protec-
tions to exploit their labor sources. Western corporations, however, 
saddled with the protective laws of their home states, would be pro-
hibited from capitalizing in this way.88 The predictable result would be 
a massive shift in location of original legal incorporation away from 
developed nations into the jurisdictions with the lowest levels of hu-
man rights protection. This, in turn, would result in a rapid elimina-
tion of protective laws in the countries that currently do protect hu-
man rights in an attempt to encourage corporate headquarters to 
repatriate.89 Hence, another race to the bottom.9o 
Is Not Gold: Cong;ressionally-Driven Global Environmental Policy, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 
499,519-29 (1999). 
87 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l (1994). See generally A Blow Against 
Bribery: Michael Hershman 011 the OECD Campaign over Corruption, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 
23,1998, at 14. 
88 Spar notes that it is difficult for competing companies to insist on superior labor 
standards or pay higher wages due to the force of the market: "if one firm pays the higher 
wage or refuses to do business with an exploitative low-cost sub-contractor, it risks losing 
market share to more callous competitors." Spar, supra note 65, at 10. 
89 This argument is perhaps most popularly known as the "giant sucking sound" that 
Ross Perot, 1992 and 1996 presidential candidate, predicted the United States would hear 
after NAFTA was signed. See, e.g., Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection 
of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AJ.I.L. 268, 298 (1997). 
90 As a means for addressing this issue, Human Rights Watch and others have recently 
modified their activities around the issue of TNCs to include the activities of all businesses, 
thereby eliminating the protest on the part of TNCs that they would have to behave under 
one standard while domestic businesses would have the competitive advantage of less 
stringent human rights and environmental standards. 
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There are flaws, however, in this race to the bottom argument. 
First, there are a number of cost advantages and profit motives that 
influence corporations to establish subsidiaries or to en ter in to pro-
duction contracts with foreign governments or corporations. Cer-
tainly, wage laws and labor regulations are among these considera-
tions, but they are not alone. For example, the potential to access new 
foreign domestic markets and favorable tax laws of foreign jurisdic-
tions are important considerations. It is also important to note that 
the infrastructural, technological, and legal amenities available in the 
current locations of western corporate headquarters would encourage 
these en tities to stay where they curren tly are located. Finally, assum-
ing that the commitment on the part of some corporations to abide 
by human rights standards though voluntary codes of conduct is sin-
cere, it does not make sense that legislation mandating the same types 
of protections would result in a rapid expatriation. In this respect, the 
adoption of voluntary codes of conduct is a valuable endeavor. It 
shows that corporations are willing, and can afford, to raise their la-
bor and environmental standards-negating one of the primary ar-
guments against legislation mandating such improvements. The adop-
tion of codes of conduct also seems to have resulted in general 
agreement that the "only way to solve [the] free-rider problem is 
through collective action. "91 This recognition that corporations have 
collectively been free-riding and must collectively terminate this be-
havior is encouraging. However, it seems that the only real reason to 
favor voluntary codes of conduct over legislation forcing compliance 
with human rights law is to escape the potential of legal accountability 
if the standards are violated. 
C. Institutional Shifting: Responses of Economic 
Institutions to Human Rights 
The interactions between human rights advocates and corpora-
tions have resulted in a variety of experiments with codes of conduct. 
A notable success of the human rights community in this effort has 
been the relatively common incorporation of human rights language 
per se in these codes.92 This success can serve as a model for continued 
negotiation with the international economic institutions discussed in 
this section. The World Bank, IMF, and wro, to varying degrees, 
91 See, e.g., Spar, supra note 65, at 10. 
92 See, e.g., supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing business principles 
adopted by Reebok in 1990). 
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have been slowly accepting their roles in the promotion and protec-
tion of the ideas encompassed by human rights. Notable, however, is 
their discomfort with accepting and utilizing the strong utopian lan-
guage of international human rights law and norms in their stated 
goals of sustainable development and poverty alleviation. 
1. The World Bank 
Prior to 1991, the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (the World Bank) failed to recognize any nexus between 
its mission and human rights per se.93 Between 1990 and 1991, how-
ever, the World Bank adopted two new institution-wide directives to 
stem the human rights abuses most often cited in connection with the 
development projects in which it was involved. The first directive ad-
dressed the problem of involuntary settlement, which often occurs 
when a development project is executed.94 The second directive con-
cerned the rights of indigenous people when development projects 
interfere with their well-being.95 
Thomas Berger, who in September 1991 was appointed Deputy 
Chairman of the Independent Review of the Sardar Sarovar Projects, 
commenting on the policy directives leading up to his appointment, 
states: 
These policy changes at the World Bank reflect the world-
wide development of human rights concepts. These changes 
constitute a recognition that large-scale projects, especially 
in rural, wilderness and frontier areas, may displace people 
just as war and natural calamities do. The policy changes fo-
cus on people who are being displaced by the advance of de-
velopment, and require that in any project the human rights 
of the oustees must be respected. According to the ILO, 
95 See CAROL R. WILSON, THE WORLD BANK GROUP: A GUIDE TO INFORMATION SOURCES 
294 (1991). This guide is a 247 page bibliography that gathers sources about the World 
Bank that were published or translated into English from 1944 to 1990. Books, periodicals, 
articles, government publications, pamphlets, and reference works are cited. The heading 
"human rights" does not even appear in this index. Id. at 301. Under "labor" there is one 
entry. Id. Similarly, under "Right to Development" there is one entry. Id. at 310. It is inter-
esting to note that while human rights were paid so litde attention before the early 1990s, 
there were twenty-two entries under the heading "environment." Id. at 290. 
94 WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE, INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT (OP /BP 
4.12) (2001). 
9!1 WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (OP/BP 4.10) (up-
dated version to be adopted 2002). 
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these rights should not be impaired on grounds of national 
sovereignty or national economic interest. While such con-
siderations may justify a project; they do not justify the 
nullification of these basic human rights.96 
83 
These directives reflect a shift in World Bank policy. They also serve as 
useful mechanisms to question the World Bank and the countries that 
it aids regarding human rights violations.97 
Mter adopting the operational directives mentioned above, the 
World Bank established an Independent Review panel in 1991 to 
evaluate its Sardar Sarovar project in India.98 This review was not en-
tirely favorable and cited both the World Bank and the government of 
India for human rights abuses in the execution of the development 
project under review.99 Ultimately, the author of the review asserted 
that development projects should be initiated only if they comport 
with human rights and environmental standards. loo 
As a result of negative reviews such as this one, the World Bank 
has tried to redirect its development projects toward small scale, inte-
grated programs "that are economically sustainable, environmentally 
benign and embraced by the people they purport to help. "101 In 1997 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, stated his 
96 Thomas R. Berger, The World Bank's Independent Review of India s Sardar Sarovar Proj-
ects, 9 AM. UJ. INT'L L. & POL'y 33, 41 (1993). The World Bank appointed Mr. Berger 
Deputy Chairman of the Independent Review of the Sardar Sarovar Projects in September 
1991. 
97 See id. 
98 Id. at 33. "[T) he Independent Review developed out of controversy over whether 
India and the governments of Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh have complied 
with resettlement, rehabilitation, and environmental impact mitigation policies implicated 
in the Sardar Sarovar Projects." Id. at 33 n.2. The Sardar Sarovar project is a massive dam 
project in the Indian Narmada River valley to which the World Bank contributed a loan in 
the amount of 450 million dollars. 
99 "In some cases, involuntary resettlement resulting from the Sardar Sarovar offended 
recognized norms of human rights." Id. at 42-43. The author of the review called this result 
"ironic, given that both India and the World Bank have been in the forefront of efforts to 
secure human rights." Berger, supra note 96, at 43. 
100 Berger, supra note 96,. at 47-48. Berger contends that "effective and equitable de-
velopment" can be best achieved though integrating human rights obligations and a 
commitment to the environment into the initial design of a project. He criticizes beliefs 
that integrating these concerns into large-scale projects adds difficulty and cost. These 
beliefs "imply that human and environmental costs are to be heavily discounted in project 
planning and execution", which Berger argues are unacceptable in light of the past. He 
recommends looking for alternatives to projects that require large scale relocation or se-
verely effect the environment. Id. 
101 Richard W. Stevenson, The Chief Banker for the Nations at the Bottom of the Heap, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 14, 1997, § 3, at 12. 
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intention "to foster closer links among the human rights experts of 
the treaty bodies, the mechanisms of the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights, and all the entities of the United Nations system, 
including the World Bank. "102 As part of this enlightened policy to-
ward development projects, the World Bank invited hundreds of envi-
ronmental, human rights, and poverty-fighting organizations to par-
ticipate in World Bank initiatives and project analyses,Io3 In fact, the 
World Bank produced a draft form Handbook on Good Practices for 
Laws Relating to Non-Governmental Organizations. I04 Further, when 
NGO's are involved in its projects, the World Bank now functions un-
der a Good Practices Directive.105 An increase in the number ofNGOs 
monitoring and advocating human rights in the context of World 
Bank activity is a positive step in increasing enforcement of human 
rights norms. I06 
Still, there is reason for skepticism. At least one NGO has warned 
that the internationally protected right of freedom of association was 
potentially infringed upon by the 1997 draft of the Handbook for laws 
regulating NGOs and NGO behavior.lo7 Also, there is evidence that 
even after the adoption of the directives mentioned above, the World 
Bank has continued to violate the human rights it has asserted it will 
aim to protect. IOS This is not surprising, given that, although individ-
ual member states may veto measures that aid countries that engage 
102 Kofi A. Annan, Essay: Strengthening United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights: 
Prospects and Priorities, 10 HARV. HUM. Rrs.J. I, 7 (1997). 
103 Stevenson, supra note 101, at 13. 
104 THE INT'L CENTER FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAw, HANDBOOK OF GOOD PRACTICES FOR 
LAws RELATING TO NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: DISCUSSION DRAFT (1997). 
105 See THE WORLD BANK OPERATION MANUAL: GOOD PRACTICES: INVOLVING NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN BANK-SUPPORTED ACTIVITIES, GP 14.70 (2000). The 
February 2000 OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 14.70 replaces the original WORLD BANK DI-
RECTIVE 14.70, issued in March, 1998. ld. This WORLD BANK GOOD PRACTICES DIRECTIVE 
defines the role of NGOs in its activities. Among other things, it defines the types of NGO 
involvement and the limitations ofNGOs seeking to participate in World Bank activities. 
106 See WORLD REpORT 1998, supra note 43, at xvi-vii. 
107 LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., THE WORLD BANK, NGOs AND FREEDOM OF Asso-
CIATION: A CRITIQUE OF TIlE WORLD BANK'S DRAFT "HANDBOOK OF GOOD PRACTICES FOR 
LAws RELATING TO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS' 1 (1997) (arguing that im-
proper regulation of NGOs can result in governmental suppression of unpopular organi-
zations). 
108 For example, between 1985 and 1993, the World Bank contributed more than half 
of the 238 million dollars necessary to complete the Indonesian Kedung Ombo Dam Proj-
ect. The construction of this dam and reservoir resulted in the displacement of 30,000 
people in violation of Indonesian law and World Bank Policy. IN TIlE NAME OF DEVELOP-
MENT, supra note 47, at 4. 
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in gross human rights violations,109 the World Bank does not require 
countries to guarantee observance of internationally recognized hu-
man rights as a precondition to receiving assistance. In fact, under the 
Bank's Articles of Agreement, its only lending criteria remain "eco-
nomic considerations. "110 While this term has recently been inter-
preted to include health, environmental, and gender related mat-
ters,111 the World Bank remains unwilling to condition its lending on 
a demonstrated commitment to human rights. 
As late as 1998, the World Bank continued to present itself as a 
politically neutral institution,1l2 independent of the human rights re-
gime. However, in September 1998, in celebration of the 50th Anni-
versary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the World 
Bank published a document declaring its commitment to integrating 
human rights concerns, especially economic, social, and cultural 
rights, in its activities.113 In this publication, the World Bank acknowl-
edged the need to reinvigorate its commitment to human rights,114 
increase its contacts with civil society,115 and invited civil society to 
109 See e.g .• 22 U.S.C. § 262d (2000) (governing u.s. participation in international 
financial institutions, such as the World Bank and encouraging U.S. representatives to vote 
against aid to countries whose governments engage in gross human rights violations). At 
least one commentator has argued at length that such legislation runs the risk of harmfully 
politicizing the World Bank. See BARTRAM S. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLI-
TICIZATION OF THE WORLD BANK: ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw AND POLICY 232 (1992). 
However, even he acknowledges that: 
[t]he bank could justify considering the human rights implications of pro-
posed projects by referring to [its purpose enumerated in its Articles of 
Agreement]. Apparently some consensus on the relevance of human rights 
considerations to World Bank lending decisions has been reached among the 
Group of Seven countries (US, Japan, Germany, Britain, France, Italy and 
Canada) who con trol a decisive bloc of power within the Bank. 
[d. at 240. 
llO DEVELOPING STATES, supra note 53, at 123. 
III IN THE NAME OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 47, at 3; see also VICWRIA E. Marmor-
stein, World Bank Power to Consider Human Rights Factors in Loan Decisions, 13 J. INT'L L. & 
ECON. 113, 129-30 (1978). 
112 For an assertion that the World Bank and other multilateral development banks are 
apolitical institutions, see ROBERT KNELLER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON 
WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT AsSISTANCE: CONGRESSIONAL POLICY V. THE APOLITICAL PUR-
POSES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS 6-16 (1980). 
lIS See generally THE INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., THE WORLD BANK, 
DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK (1998). 
114 [d. at 1-3. 
115 [d. at 4, 26-29. 
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"continue to press the needs of the neglected, the isolated, and the 
victimized. "116 
Starting relatively quietly in June of 1999 and much more notably 
in November 1999, large numbers of activists and protesters began a 
concerted and loosely connected struggle to bring attention to the 
actions of the World Bank, IMF, wro, and other international eco-
nomic actors. Their activities brought a great level of attention to the 
issues surrounding the activities of these economic institutions and 
their social and environmental impacts. By raising popular awareness 
of economic globalization and World Bank activity, such protests have 
arguably placed the human rights community in a better position to 
negotiate with the economic community.117 
This Article concerns itself with the contacts and negotiations 
between these two communities and, more importantly, the product 
of these contacts. It encourages human rights advocates to use this 
improved position to its fullest advantage, keeping in mind the power 
of the utopian language of human rights and its rhetorical appeal to a 
democratic public. As the human rights community makes inroads 
with the World Bank and other institutions, it is essential that human 
rights advocates adhere to the traditional language of human rights 
rather than seek the approbation associated with the traditionally 
economic language of the World Bank or other economic institutions. 
2. The International Monetary Fund 
Compared to the World Bank, the IMF continues to operate in 
greater isolation from human rights concerns.118 In part, this is due to 
the IMF's primary concern with implementing macroeconomic poli-
cies that lead to "high productivity, high employment, high savings 
and consequently more investment and a higher flow of export 
trade. "119 The organization is less involved with the microeconomic 
issues in which the World Bank participates.12o While the World Bank 
116Id. at 30. 
117 The efficacy of the protests, however, is neither the focus nor the concern of this 
Article. The protests by rights activists, in the framework of this Article, occur either on the 
margins of negotiations with the economic community or as a predecessor to such nego-
tiations. 
118 See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Crossing the Rubicon: Synthesizing the Soft International Law 
oftheIMF and Human Rights, 11 B.U. INT'L. LJ. 81, 87-88 (1993). 
119 DEVELOPING STATES, supra note 53, at 95. 
120 The IMF provides loans to countries facing balance-of-payment problems for the 
purpose of restoring conditions for sustainable economic growth. These loans enable 
countries to rebuild their monetary reserves, stabilize their currencies, and continue pay-
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or regional development banks lend for specific projects, the IMF in-
stead assists countries for discrete periods of time. Its macro level of 
operations, therefore, has sheltered the IMF from a direct linkage to 
human rights violations for longer than the World Bank or regional 
development banks.121 Additionally, the shorter time frame of IMF 
involvement makes it difficult for the IMF to require member states to 
improve their human rights records during the period of IMF in-
volvement in a particular project.l22 
Historically, the IMF was extremely reluctant to publicly suggest 
that it should playa role in the promotion of human rights objec-
tives.123 Since its inception, however, the IMF has been in a powerful 
position to influence human rights implementation in its member 
states.124 Two mechanisms within the IMF procedures, Article IV con-
sultation and conditionality, create avenues via which the IMF could 
advance human rights. 125 The IMF may consider political issues in 
ing for imports without having to unpose trade restrictions or other strict monetary meas-
ures. See Rajagopal, supra note 118, at 89. 
121 See supra notes 94, 95, and accompanying text (discussing the World Bank Direc-
tives regarding involuntary resettlement and indigenous peoples). 
122 See Rajagopal, supra note 118, at 89-92. 
125 Daniel D. Bradlow, Symposium: Social Justice and Development: Critical Issues Facing the 
Bretton Woods System, 6 ThANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 78-79 (1996). Further, 
Bradlow contends that it is difficult to even find the IMF's policy on human rights. The 
writings and statements of its representatives are the main indication of an IMF position 
on human rights. These writings and statements, however, send contradictory messages. 
They sometimes recognize the importance of human rights to the development process 
but at other times suggest that the IMF can not playa role in promoting human rights. 
Bradlow argues that these statements do not, however, "explain why, if human rights are so 
important, the IMF can ignore them in its operations and policies." Id. at 79 (citation 
omitted). 
124 Id. at 50. 
125 Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement requires the IMF to engage in regular 
consultations with its member states about their exchange rate policies. Articles of Agree-
ment of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, art. IV, sec. I, 29 V.S.T. 2203, 
2208-10,2 V.N.T.S. 39, 51 [hereinafter IMF Articles]. For a description of Article IV con-
sultations, see, for example, RICHARD W. EDWARDS, JR., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COL-
LABORATION 22,558-68, 571-80 (1985). In practice, these consultations have often ex-
tended into a wide range of domestic policies. Bradlow, noting the scope of the 
consultations, suggests that the IMF has the capability of influencing the human rights 
practices in its Member States. See generally Bradlow, supra note 123. (citations omitted). 
During these consultations, "the IMF has been known to engage the Member State in dis-
cussions of its policies relating to health care, environment, welfare, housing, unemploy-
ment, labor markets, military expenditures, and certain aspects of the management of the 
State's public sector." Id at 50. 
Consultations, used by the IMF to develop its policies toward individual countries, can 
influence the conditions that a country must meet in order to access IMF funds. The de-
gree of the IMF's influence varies depending on the Member State's need for financial 
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conducting consultation and in determining conditionality factors. 126 
In fact, the IMF has more freedom to consider human rights issues 
than does the World Bank.127 While the World Bank specifically began 
considering human rights issues some time ago, the IMF historically 
interpreted its Articles in a way that to allowed it to remain uninvolved 
in advancing human rightS. 128 The IMF did not construe its responsi-
bility as one that required promoting human rights. Rather it con-
strued its responsibility only as a duty to address the "social dimen-
sions" of the macroeconomic policies it prescribes for member 
states.129 
In 1995, however, there were two indications that the IMF was 
becoming more aware of it's unique position to affect human rights. 
The first indication was the public IMF acknowledgment that "the 
importance of social issues for sustainable economic and social devel-
opment has become increasingly evident. "130 At that time, the IMF 
recognized that it holds an important position of persuasion and ex-
pressed its intention to use that position to further "improv[e] gov-
ernments' capacity to monitor social developments and pursue trans-
parent social policies."131 The IMF, however, expressed its intention to 
do this through policy discussions and technical assistance132 rather 
than by establishing human rights or economic justice conditions on 
support. Since the advice given by the IMF in the Article IV consultati.ons may be con-
verted into the conditionalities attached to IMF financing, the IMF is able to exert greater 
influence over those Member States who need or expect to need its financial assistance. Id. 
126 See JOSEPH GOLD, INT'L MONETARY FUND, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE IMF 61 (1980). 
For more on conditionality and its relation to human rights, see generally Michael Lucas, 
The International Monetary Fund's Conditionality and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: An Attempt to Define the Relation, 25 REVUE BELGE DE DEDROIT 
INTERNATIONAL [Beligan ReviewofInternational Lawll04 (1992). 
127 Bradlow, supra note 123, at 81. 
128 See GOLD, supra note 126, at 61. Summarizing the IMF's official position, former 
IMF President, Michel Camdessus, has stated, "Nothing in our articles tells us that we have 
to look at the moral quality of the policies of the country. Nor do we have to consider 
whether the country is perfectly democratic or not." J. Oloka-Onyango, Beyond the Rhetoric: 
Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social Rights, 26 CAL. W. INT'l. LJ. 1, 25 n.141 
(1995). 
129 See INT'L MONETARY FUND, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF THE IMF's POLICY DIALOGUE 1-
4 (1995), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/social.htm (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2002) [hereinafter IMF POLICY DIALOGUEl. This pamphlet was presented by the 
staff of the IMF for the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, March 6-
12,1995. 
130 Id. at 1. 
131 Id. at 3. 
132Id. 
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the use of IMF funds. 133 The second indication of the IMF's increasing 
human rights awareness was its explicit recognition of the potential 
benefit of consultation with United Nations agencies with expertise 
on the "social dimensions" of human rights.l 34 At that time, however, 
the IMF only hinted at the need to begin consultation with NGOs.l35 
Emerging from its 1999 annual meeting, the IMF began to 
openly and consistently acknowledge a role in poverty reduction and 
its associated human rights protections. At that time it decided to 
strengthen its focus on poverty by replacing the Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility (ESAF) with the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF).l36 Loans under the PRGF are provided to the world's 
poorest countries and are based on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSP), which articulate each borrowing country's strategy for pov-
erty reduction and integrate macroeconomic, structural, and social 
policies into one document. The key features that distinguish the 
PRGF /PRSP procedure from the ESAF include vesting the borrowing 
country with design and ownership of its own poverty reduction strat-
egy; integral participation of the World Bank in all poverty reduction 
mid. at 4-6. 
184 "The IMF is collaborating closely with the World Bank and other agencies in the 
design, implementation, and monitoring of social policies." IMF POLICY DIALOGUE, supra 
note 129, at 2. 
!!I5 For example, the IMF stated: 
Improvement of monitoring and social policies and social indicators in the 
context of IMF-supported programs is being pursued as central to the 
achievement of sustainable high-quality growth. Improving collaboration with 
the World Bank, U.N. agencies, and others, with the objective that each institu-
tion focus on areas of comparative advantage, is the best way to achieve-
without duplication of work-a better follow-up on the implementation of 
social policies in programs. 
ld. at 27-28 (emphasis added). 
186 This decision emerged out of the annual IMF meeting of September 1999. The 
PRGF replaced the ESAF as the primary loan assistance program to poor countries facing 
balance of payment problems. The key features of this program are described herein. For 
a more detailed description of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, see INT'L 
MONETARY FUND. THE IMF's POVERTY REDUCTION AND GROWTH FACILITY (PRGF): A 
FACTSHEET (Mar. 2001). at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prgf.htm (last 
visited Oct. 2. 2002) [hereinafter POVERTY REDUCTION]. Prior to 1999. the IMF provided 
assistance to low-income countries through the ESAF. ESAF arrangements. established in 
1987. provide medium-term loans on concessional terms to support macroeconomic ad-
justment and domestic reforms in poor countries facing trade deficits. For a more detailed 
description of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility. see INT'L MONETARY FUND, 
IMF CONCESSIONAL FINANCING THROUGH ESAF (Sept. 1999), at http://www.imf.org/ex-
ternal/np/ exr /facts/ esaf.htm (last visited Oct. 2. 2002). 
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strategies; and involvement of scholars, international institutions, 
N Gas, and civil society generally in the design of the PRSPs.137 
The IMF now intends to maintain consideration and incorpora-
tion of social policies at the level of the PRSP.138 If PRSPs function as 
they are designed, the IMF's involvement in a given country's eco-
nomic policy could provide borrowing countries with the opportunity 
to both assess their human rights situations and to design and imple-
ment strategies for improving domestic human rights protections. 
The May 2000 PRSP of Burkina Faso exemplifies a strategy that 
"places a high priority on human rights in its development and struc-
tural adjustment efforts. "139 Other countries took Burkina Faso's lead 
in viewing the PRSP as an opportunity to assess how better protection 
of human rights can aid in the development of their countries and 
how increased economic developmen t can aid their efforts to advance 
human rights.140 
137 See POVERTY REDUCTION, supra note 136. 
138 See id. It should be noted that the IMF is still unwilling to use conditionality as a way 
of promoting or encouraging respect for human rights in borrowing countries. Masood 
Ahmed et aI., Refocussing [MF Conditionality, 38 FIN. & DEV. 4 (2001), available at 2001 WI... 
19654132. 
139 Sergio Pereira Leite, Human Rights and the [ME, 38 FIN. & DEV. 4 ( 2001), available at 
2001 WI... 19654133. 
[d. 
[T]he May 2000 PRSP of Burkina Faso centers on human security: economic 
security (access to education, vocational training, and paid employment), 
health security (access to low-cost preventive and curative medical care), food 
security (access to basic foodstuffs and safe water), environmental security 
(preservation of the environment), and individual and political security (the 
rule of law, responsibility, participation, efficiency, and transparency). The 
Burkinabe strategy does not promise that human security will be fully 
achieved during the life of the program, but it places a high priority on hu-
man rights in its development and structural adjustment efforts. 
140 Countries that have involved human rights in their poverty reduction strategy in-
clude Bolivia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Vietnam. 
[d. Sergio Pereira Leite notes that: 
[d. 
Nicaragua's September 2001 PRSP proposes measures to demarcate lands be-
longing to indigenous communities, assist the poor to meet housing needs, 
protect children in high-risk conditions, implement programs for the elderly, 
prevent domestic violence, strengthen the Office for Human Rights, and pro-
tect the rights of indigenous peoples. Rwanda's November 2000 PRSP in-
cludes a framework for good governance that incorporates a human rights 
program, as well as capacity building for the country's Human Rights Com-
mission. 
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The IMF's position on human rights demonstrates its interest in 
self-improvement and its ability to contribute to poverty alleviation-
and thereby promote human rights. The degree and speed by which 
the IMF has re.-oriented itself with regard to human rights is notable. 
Still, there is room for improvement. The IMF continues to view itself 
as an organization fundamentally unable to analyze human rights 
situations and concerns. Encouragingly, the IMF has made clear its 
commitment to continued improvement of its activities. HI It has 
stated that it will depend on other international institutions, the work 
of NGOs, and civil society to help it in this arena.1 42 Marked im-
provement to IMF policy can surely be made by involving these con-
tributors. As will be discussed below, the vigilance of these actors in 
promoting the utopian language and ideas of human rights is essen-
tial to ensure that human rights are protected all over the world. 
3. The World Trade Organization 
The "WTO is, without debate, the multilateral economic institu-
tion making the last stand for isolating its policies and practices from 
the incursions of human rights concerns. The historical progression 
of the "WTO's position on collaboration with other multilateral institu-
tions, NGOs, and civil society is very similar to such collaboration by 
the World Bank and the IMF. Until recently, the "WTO had not fos-
tered any real communication with its economic counterparts-de-
spite agreements between the institutions to do so.143 Further, it had' 
not established formal methods for cooperation and communication 
between itself and the United Nations, the United Nation's human 
rights organs, or members of civil society, including NGOs. 
Since 1999, the United Nations Sub-Commission on Promotion 
and Protection of Minorities has repeatedly publicized its concerns 
regarding the insular, non-transparent, non-democratic nature of 
"WTO proceduresl44 and the substantive effect of particular "WTO 
141 See. e.g., IMF POLICY DIALOGUE, supra note 129, at 27-28. See generally. INT'L MONE-
TARY FUND ET AL., A BETTER WORLD FOR ALL (2000), available at http://www.imf.org/ 
external!pubs/ft/jointpub/world/2000/ eng/bwae.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2002) [herein-
after A BETTER WORLD FOR ALL]. 
142 Leite, supra note 139. 
143 See wro, COHERENCE-CLOSER COOPERATION BETWEEN MULTILATERAL INSTITU-
TIONS, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/coher_e.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 2, 2002) (containing links to all relevant documents regarding coherence and 
cooperation with the World Bank and the IMF). 
144 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON Hu-
MAN RIGHTS, ThE REALIZATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: HUMAN 
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rules or practices.145 Commentators have also noted the insular nature 
of the WTO, the potential negative effects of the WTO's work on hu-
man rights, and the organization's reluctance to engage sectors of the 
international community concerned with human rights,146 
It was not until its Fourth Ministerial Conference held in Doha, 
Qatar in November 2001, that the WTO first indicated some response 
to calls for change in its policy. The Doha Development Agenda, 
which resulted from this conference, refocuses the work of the WTO 
to the situation of the world's poorest nations and people.147 Moreo-
ver, there is ample evidence that as a result of the Doha Development 
Agenda the WTO is undergoing a significant shift in its orientation 
and openness to human rights concerns and the welfare of the indi-
viduals affected by its work,148 One example of this shift is the WTO's 
2002 Annual Report, which acknowledges that "certain adjustments to 
RIGHTS AS TIlE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL ThADE, INVESTMENT AND FINANCE 
POLICY AND PRACTICE, U.N. Doc. E/CN/Sub.2/1999/11 (1999); UNITED NATIONS Eco-
NOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ARISING IN TIlE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
TIlE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: STATE-
MENT OF TIlE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
TO TIlE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF TIlE WORLD ThADE ORGANIZATION, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1999/9 (1999). 
145 See UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, THE REALIZATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS 
AS TIlE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL ThADE, INVESTMENT AND FINANCE POLICY 
AND PRACTICE, U.N. Doc. E/CN/Sub.2/1999/11 (1999); UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL COUNCIL, SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ARISING IN TIlE IMPLEMENTATION OF TIlE INTERNA-
TIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: STATEMENT OF TIlE 
UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS TO TIlE MIN-
ISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF TIlE WORLD ThADE ORGANIZATION, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/9 
(1999); UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF TIlE AGREEMENT ON 
ThADE-RELATED AsPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (2001); UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: LIBERALIZA-
TION OF ThADE IN SERVICES AND HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9 
(2002); UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: GLOBALIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON 
TIlE FULL ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/54 (2002) (encom-
passing the report by the High Commissioner on Human Rights regarding human rights 
approaches to the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture). 
146 See, e.g., Howse & Mutua, supra note 7, at 13. 
147 WTO, MINISTERIAL DECLARATION, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 14, 2001), available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/minded_e.htm (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2002). 
148 See, e.g., Mike Moore, Making Globalization Work, Speech to the International Con-
federation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) (Feb. 20, 2002), available at http://www.wto. 
org/wto/english/news_e/spmm76_e.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002). 
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the [WTO] rules [are] needed if the trading system is to better reflect 
the social, economic, and political conditions of a rapidly changing 
world. "149 In this report, the WTO also addresses the high level of 
concern on the part of the United Nations, academic commentators, 
and NGOs regarding the WTOs' lack of transparency and abysmal 
record for consulting with civil society and NGOs.150 
One proposal for facilitating WTO consideration of human rights 
law is to establish a human rights office at the World Trade Organiza-
tion.I51 This proposal recognizes the current failings of both unilat-
eral and multilateral human rights enforcement mechanisms. It ar-
gues that human rights advocacy and WTO enforcement mechanisms 
should be combined in order to take advantage of the strengths of the 
two systems.152 Such a combination would be comprised of a multilat-
eral regime using sanctions to enforce core human rights and remedy 
violations of those rights. Thus, the might of unilateral actions, in the 
149 wro, ANNUAL REpORT 2002, at 2 (2002). The Annual Report also notes: 
Agreement still remains elusive on precisely how existing rules should be 
changed and what form necessary new rules should take. But at Doha the 
wro achieved something that many skeptics had suggested was beyond the 
organization's grasp: the launch of a new trade round. Even the sternest crit-
ics of globalization today accept that the alternative to multilateral rules is re-
liance on the law of the jungle. With the Doha Development Agenda, we are 
now on course to negotiate the necessary changes and new rules. 
Id. at 2. 
Id. 
150 Id at 4. The report states, in part: 
Although there is no consensus among wro Members in favour of involving 
NGOs directly in the organization's work, the existing guidelines on external 
relations were designed by Members to give the Secretariat an appropriate 
degree of flexibility to allow responsible NGOs a voice in the dialogue. Within 
these guidelines, an increasing number of symposia have been held, involving 
a wide range of civil society actors, including parliamentarians, chambers of 
commerce, trade unions and many groups with particular focus on such is-
sues as development and the environment. We have also greatly improved the 
dissemination of information to the general public through our website, 
which in the first quarter of 2002 recorded more than half a million visitors 
per month. Visitors downloaded monthly the equivalent of over 100 million 
pages of text. 
151 Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Hu-
man Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization, 11 AM. U J. INT'L L. & 
POL'y 1, 4 (1996). For another proposal to introduce rights into the wro, see Daniel S. 
Ehrenberg, From Intention to Action: An ILO-GATT/WTO Enforcement Regime for International 
Labor Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 163, 163-181 
(Compa & Diamond eds., 1996). 
152 Stirling, supra note 151, at 33. 
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form of trade sanctions by a powerful nation, can be made even 
mightier by the multilateral support of other less powerful nations.153 
One benefit of this approach is the possibility that a human rights 
office within the wro could ensure that human rights are integrated 
into wro policies in a transparent and predictable manner. 
Another strategy for wro reform lies in Article XX of the GAIT. 
It is widely accepted that human rights advocates should focus on this 
section to support the inclusion of human rights concerns in the pol-
icy and decisions of the wrO.154 Article XX of the GAIT states that 
nothing in the GAIT 
shall be construed to prevent the enforcement by any con-
tracting party of measures . . . necessary to protect public 
morals ... human, animal or plant life or health, [or] relat-
ing to the conservation of exhaustible natural resource 
measures ... essential to the acquisition or distribution of 
products in general or local short supply [and] ... relating 
to the products of prison labour.155 
One commentator contends that consideration of basic human 
rights has been a part of the GAIT system since its inception. She 
points out that Article XX of the GAIT, which allows the exclusion of 
products made with prison labor, has never been challenged by the 
GAIT /wro member states.156 In fact, through advocating for a wro 
social clause, a number of nations have pushed to include a wider 
range of human rights provisions.157 Furthermore, Article XX(e) al-
ready lays the groundwork for a human rights body within the wrO. 
Trade and human rights are already linked within the GAIT because 
"Article XX(e) appears to permit one member to use trade sanctions 
to protect the human rights of citizens of another member. "158 
153Id. 
154 See generally id.; Howse & Matua, supra note 7 (pointing to Article XX as a mecha-
nism for the inclusion of human rights concerns in the policies and decisions of the 
wrO). 
155 GAIT, openedforsignatureOct. 30,1947, Gl Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 184,262. This was 
amended in 1994. See id. at art. XX. 
156 Stirling, supra note 151, at 35-36. 
157 A number of nations have declared their commitment to a wide range of labor pro-
tections, leading to the establishment of the World Commission on the Social Dimension 
of Globalization within the International Labour Organization. See INTERNATIONAL LA-
BOUR ORGANIZATION, WORLD COMMISSION ON '!HE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF GLOBALIZATION: 
BACKGROUND, at http://www.ilo.org/public.english/wcsdg/background.htm (last vi-sited 
Oct. 16, 2002). 
158 Stirling, supra note 151, at 38. 
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This proposal is appealing because it provides a multilateral 
mechanism for the enforcement of human rights that is intrinsically 
tied to entry into globalized trade. It is problematic, though, because 
it limits exposure to sanctions by limiting the rights-which if violated 
would be legitimate grounds for multilateral trade sanctions-to the 
most widely accepted civil and political rights. 159 Although this ad-
heres to the traditional hierarchical structure of human rights, such a 
proposal has the effect of undermining a strand of the genealogy of 
Article XX, the very hook used to validate the proposal for a human 
rights office at the wrO.t60 
The wro is no longer as insular or as opaque as it was just two 
years ago. The Doha Development Agenda changed the landscape for 
the wro and for those who advocate for wro inclusion of human 
rights concerns. Although it has not created official avenues for civil 
society'S and the United Nations human rights bodies' participation, 
these sectors clearly have started to enter into negotiations with the 
wrO. 
Mike Moore, the Director-General of the wro, stated unequivo-
cally in his farewell address to the wro General Counsel that the 
wro has a new focus to help the world's poor. 161 As his closing re-
mark he stated: "I will continue to serve the public. I can think of no 
greater vocation. I may even join an NGO or march with the protest-
ers to the gates of this very institution. You will know me immediately. 
My banner will say 'Justice Now, Finish the Round. "'162 If this should 
ever come to pass, perhaps the new "VTO Director General, Dr. Su-
159 Id. at 39. "These rights would include freedom from torture, collective punish-
ments, prolonged arbitrary detention, genocide, slavery, or threats to commit any of these 
acts." Id. 
160 See ICESCR, supra note 84, at art. 7 (recognizing the right of everyone to the en-
joyment of just and favorable conditions of work, which include fair wages and equal re-
muneration for work of equal value, as well as a right to safe and healthy working condi-
tions). Stirling does, however, include freedom from slavery in her short list of human 
rights which should be enforced by the proposed wro human rights body. Stirling, supra 
note 151, at 39. The right to freedom from slavery is set out in the ICCPR, stating: "No one 
shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms shall be prohibited." 
ICCPR supra note 84, at art. 8. 
161 See Mike Moore, Director General's Farewell Speech to the General Council (July 31, 2002), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm89_e.htm (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2002). He states therein that "The Doha Development Agenda is urgent too be-
cause more than half of the world's population continue to live on less than 2 dollars a day 
and a successful conclusion to the round can help lift billions of people out of poverty. 
This Agenda is about them. Our greatest motivation is the people we serve." Id. 
162Id. 
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pachai Panitchpakdi, will see fit to open the doors and talk with both 
his predecessor and his newly befriended NGO colleagues. 
4. Shaping a Nexus: Encounters Between International Financial 
Institutions and Human Rights 
International economic institutions quite clearly are uncomfort-
able with the language of human rights. They prefer to address 
specific "social issues" rather than open themselves to the far broader 
and more substantive area of human rights. To illustrate, in 2000 the 
IMF, together with the United Nations, the World Bank, and 
ECOSOC, published A Better World for All, which stated the joint com-
mitment of these organizations to alleviate poverty and consider de-
velopment-related issues. 163 Although this document does mention 
human rights generally, it neither names specific articles of the basic 
human rights documents nor directly refers to specific human rights 
per se. When referring to its specific goal of reducing infant mortality 
rates, for example, the document does not refer to this "social issue" 
as embodied in Article 12(2) (a) of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.164 
Likewise, the IMF's and the World Bank's uneasiness with assign-
ing these "social issues" their internationally accepted status as human 
rights was again made clear in January 2002 when the IMF Managing 
Director and the World Bank President held a Townhall Meeting with 
civil society representatives participating in the International Confer-
ence on Poverty Reduction Strategies. When addressing the particular 
topic of labor and union movements on behalf of both institutions, 
James Wolfensohn, the World Bank President, gave this illustrative 
comment: 
Ijust met a few months ago with John Sweeney on the sub-
ject, and we're in regular contact with the international la-
bor union movements to try and see what we can do to 
bridge that gap. But I really believe that, while we don't call 
it a rights-based approach, which Mrs. Robinson would like 
us to do, on each issue we are, in fact, addressing the ques-
tions which Mrs. Robinson is addressing. 
163 See generally A BETTER WORLD FOR ALL, supra note 141. 
164 See ICESCR, supra note 84, at art. 12(2) (a). The document does, however, detail the 
combined goals of all these organizations to improve and promote this and other "social 
issues" which, in the ICESCR and the ICCPR, have previously been accorded the status of 
rights. See generally A BETTER WORLD FOR ALL, supra note 141. 
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I don't want to move to a rights-based approach because I 
think I'm stronger in what I'm doing, but we will continue 
the discussion with Mrs. Robinson on whether it should be 
[framed that way] .... 165 
97 
While clearly acknowledging the importance of the goals enumerated 
in established human rights instruments, and in fact stating that the 
World Bank and the IMF are "addressing the questions" which human 
rights law aims to address, the reluctance of the World Bank President 
to take a "rights-based" approach is puzzling. If the work of these 
financial institutions is, as President Wolfensohn suggests, substan-
tially equivalent to what it would be if they used a rights-based ap-
proach, it seems essential to press for the reasons behind their reluc-
tance to use the language of rights. 
While there may be disagreement over which rights international 
financial institutions have a responsibility to uphold, there should be 
little disagreement that these institutions now consider the ideas em-
bodied by human rights a factor in their operations. Increasingly, 
human rights advocates and international law scholars are focusing 
on these institutions. Consequently, a perceptible institutional aware-
ness of the importance of advancing universally accepted human 
rights has taken hold. 
In the World Bank and increasingly in the IMF, this awareness has 
now taken a relatively strong hold. In the wro, however, it is still in 
the early stages of development and remains opaque and largely 
undefined. This institutional shift is crucial to increasing the promo-
tion of human rights and the quality of human rights enforcement 
mechanisms.I66 Similarly, the entry of human rights into the every-day 
conduct of transnational corporations is evidenced in the voluntary as 
well as government-mandated and institutionally imposed codes of 
conduct discussed herein. 
The question should no longer be whether these economic inter-
national institutions and transnational corporate actors will become 
locations for the protection and advancement of human rights but 
rather how this shift will come about. This brings to the fore a whole 
range of pressing inquiries, some of which have been addressed in the 
165 Townhall Meeting: IMF Managing Director Host Kohler and World Bank President James 
Wolfensohll with Civil Society Representatives Participating in the International Conference on Pov-
erty Reduction Strategies (Jan. 17,2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/ 
2002/tr020117a.htm (last visited Oct. 2. 2002). 
166 See, e.g., Stirling, supra note 151. at 15-16, 45-46. 
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discussion above: in what capacity will traditionally economic actors 
advance human rights; to what extent will they do so; and which rights 
should be promoted or enforced. While the questions are simple, the 
answers will be complex. They should be developed carefully with the 
intention of encouraging active awareness of these rights and the rec-
ognition that international financial institutions can playa crucial 
role in the implementation and enforcement of human rights. Long 
overdue, the coming challenge is to maintain intellectual fortitude in 
the advancement of human rights at the points of contact with the 
economic sector. 
For the purposes of this Article, it is important to be cognizant of 
the entries that the human rights community, its law, and its norms 
have made into the international economic sector. These entries 
amount to a novel but tangible encounter that has been revealed 
through the investigation undertaken above. The next section of this 
Article discusses one specific aspect of this interaction: the language 
used, defined, and developed during the interchange between human 
rights institutions and advocates and their international economic 
counterparts. Specifically, this Article addresses the imperative of 
conducting the interaction between these two international domains 
in a language that maintains the compelling essence of human rights. 
It argues that this should be done in the interest of creating and ad-
vancing a language of encounter that strengthens and promotes 
rights. Essentially, it is an optimistic view of the potential for forging 
language that enhances public international law and places human 
rights concerns squarely at the center of international economic activ-
ity and policy. 
III. ANALYSIS OF A DISCOURSE 
A. The International Plane 
Many social scientists have noted the emergence of "the Global 
City" or its equivalent.167 The amalgamation of international commu-
nities with differing interests, however, is better described for the 
167 SeeSASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CI'IY; NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO 335 (1991). Sas-
sen points to the many ways that the distinctions between important cities are merging or 
blurring. For example, she illustrates that this is happening through a hegemonization of 
culture with the result that each city is losing its individual character, and she also proposes 
that for those individuals whose work and leisure makes them dependent on more than 
one of these hubs, the boundaries that once defined travel between countries are disap-
pearing. See id. at 335-38. 
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purposes of this Article as the international plane. This distinction is 
necessary because the image of a global city or the global village im-
plies a theoretical space where the inhabiting population gathers into 
one group, in a domain small enough to imagine its current and fu-
ture boundaries. l68 Further, this image implies that there is some form 
of infrastructure, generally government, necessary to conduct the ne-
gotiations and compromises needed for a culturally disparate and di-
verse populace to co-exist. 169 
The novelty of the interactions between human rights and inter-
national economic actors suggests a space much different than that of 
the global city. The international plane envisioned here, though 
identifiable, is still largely uncharted. It is possible to identify the indi-
viduals, groups, and institutions participating therein. It is also feasi-
ble to discern the locations of action and interaction of these parties. 
But defining locations of activity is different than identifying a cohe-
sive and delineated place called a city. The international plane is not a 
singular location with definable boundaries. In fact, boundaries cur-
rently seem to be its antitheses structure, from which the participants 
aim to escape. In this way, the international plane is different than a 
city. 
Additionally, unlike a village or a city, there is no singular form of 
government under which all participants are expected to behave.l7° A 
cohesive set of decrees constituting governmental control does not 
exist; there is no legal structure with which all the actors in this inter-
national plane must comply. The locations of activity on the interna-
tional plane-the various forms of in ternational law, cross-border 
business transactions, immigration, tourism, et cetera-each have 
rules governing particular activities or fields of work. For example, 
international financial institutions have articles of agreement and are 
founded on a shared philosophy that aims to advance liberal eco-
168 Black's Law Dictionary defines village as: "a modest assemblage of houses and 
buildings for dwellings and business ... [or] a municipal corporation with a smaller popu-
lation than a city.' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 1563. A city is defined as "a 
municipal corporation ... headed by a mayor and governed by a city council.' Id. at 237. 
169 See id. at 237,1563 (defining city and village). It is not the purpose of this article to 
discredit the use of terms like global city and global village. However, it is important to 
note how the use of cities and villages for illustrative analogy is not entirely accurate. Be-
cause this Article discusses issues that arise in the collision of populations that are real and 
analogized, it is necessary to illustrate the failings of these words for the analytical pur-
poses of describing globalization. 
170 For the suggestion that such an order is possible, see Kenneth S. Carlson, Interna-
tionalAdministrative Law: A Venture in Legal Theory. 8 J. PUB. L. 329, 329-77 (1959). 
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nomic policies such as free and fair trade.l71 Those advancing a global 
economic order act in accordance with these philosophies. They 
abide by and frame their work around the rules and policies central 
to their institutions. Similarly, human rights institutions share a com-
mon vision, as evidenced by the Universal Declaration for Human 
Rights and subsequent human rights instruments.172 The individuals 
participating in the development of human rights law act in accor-
dance with the philosophies, rules, and procedures that are common 
to human rights actors and often distinct from those of economic ac-
tors. 
Participation in the global involves reaching across national bor-
ders in an attempt to join people with commonalties on a global scale. 
This act creates new places of activity. For example, internet specialists 
and browsers connect with their foreign counterparts in the territory 
they call cyberspace. Similarly, indigenous peoples transgress the 
boundaries of nations and create a new location when they gather at 
the United Nations for the annual meeting of the Working Group on 
Indigenous Peoples.173 The very name of the organization "Doctors 
Without Borders" is indicative of this characteristic. 
Within the legal profession, too, specialization and internation-
alization abounds. Immigration specialists work with their counter-
parts in various countries; human rights advocates do the same. They 
create and populate sites of globalized activity. The World Bank and 
the IMF have explicit policies of hiring lawyers from a wide range of 
countries who are trained in international economic law,l74 These 
171 Compare IMF Articles, supra note 125, with Articles of Agreement of the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945,60 Stat. 1440,2 U.N.T.S. 
134. It is not at all surprising that these institutional charters are very similar. They were 
both born from the Bretton-Woods conference, which was executed by a small number of 
participants with similar visions for economic stability. 
172 This is not to diminish the differences between human rights documents. Clearly, 
there are differences, but it is indisputable that there are also similarities in language, in 
the rights advanced, and in the liberal philosophy that underlies the documents. 
173 For a description of the creation of this United Nations Working Group see S. 
JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 51 (1996). For a detailed de-
scription of the success of this Working Group and evidence that it does provide a forum 
for indigenous people from a multitude of countries to develop principles that will protect 
them, see David Weissbrodt et aI., An Analysis of the Forty-ninth Session of the United Nations 
Sub-Comission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. 
J. 221, 237 (1998). 
174 See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND, DIVERSI'IY POLICY, available at http://www.imf. 
org/externallnp/adm/rec/policy/divpolicy.htm (visited Oct. 2, 2002) (stating the IMF's 
commitmen t to strive for balance in the gender and nationality composition of its staff in 
order to achieve its goal of creating a successful international work place). 
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finance and economics-focused lawyers incarnate yet another com-
munity with its own interests. Although institutions, seminars, and 
conferences are the actualization of these locations, they can exist 
without physical or material places. These sites of activity can be 
identified and are tangible without actual embodiment. Thus, even 
actors not present physically in international institutions can partici-
pate in their particular specialized field at the international level. 
Similarly, the domain that makes up international human rights activ-
ity does not cease to exist on days without international conferences 
or meetings. Rather, this domain exists, at least on some level, simply 
because people believe themselves to be participants in international 
activity and actors on an international plane. 
What seems to emerge, therefore, is not a single global city but 
an accumulation of many theoretical locations that can be described 
as communities or perhaps sovereigns of a sort. Each is composed of 
individuals who, through self-identification with a particular activity or 
profession, participate in the life of that community.175 We can tenu-
ously call these communities sovereigns, because, to a large extent 
thus far, they have governed themselves while creating a territory that 
is not governed by the whole or by any superstructure. Each of these 
communities are bound by a mass of conflicting laws and interests of 
the various national jurisdictions of their participants. Upon entering 
the international plane, however, their relations with one another are 
also defined by the rules of the particular international community. 
Yet there is no overarching government that regulates or provides a 
single forum for interaction, cooperation, or conflict among these 
in ternationalized communities.176 
This absence of government, defined mechanisms, and forums 
for communication among the various communities that comprise 
the international plane creates a vacuum. When two or more com-
munities expand or shift in a direction that impacts another commu-
175 SeeARJUN A!'PADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE 22-23 (1996) (portraying the propen-
sity to group cultures according to difference rather than similarity). While Appadurai may 
be correct that "the emergent postnational order" may be based on relations between in-
terest groups, this Article challenges his assertion that the negotiations that make up those 
relations will result in "increased incivility and violence." Perhaps because this Article dis-
cusses the interaction between two communities that hold in common the liberal social 
contract of the modern West, it focuses on points of cooperation rather than pure contes-
tation. See id. at 23. 
176 See Carlson, supra note 170, at 182. 
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nity's zone of interest, an encounter results.177 The commumtIes or 
regimes then can either ignore any resulting discord or enter into ne-
gotiations. Negotiations, naturally, can either lead to compatibility or 
continued and more elaborate discord.178 
Part II of this paper demonstrated one point of encounter: the 
demonstrable interaction of the human rights domain and the inter-
national economic demesne. Presently, these two modern, liberal 
realms, originated and maintained as separate worlds on the interna-
tional plane, are investigating each other. Of course there are points 
of contact between these communities that remain in thorough dis-
cord. As the points of tumultuous conflict, they attract significant 
popular attention.179 More surprising and encouraging about these 
points of encounter, however, is the cooperation that emerges from 
them. Part II demonstrated a series of encounters and long negotia-
tions that have resulted in significant cooperation. The remainder of 
Part III discusses prospects for future encounters. Specifically, this sec-
tion examines the language that these interactions emit, illustrating 
the importance of consciously maintaining and promoting the strong 
aspirationallanguage of human rights. 
B. Prospects for Future Encounters 
As a preliminary matter, it is vital to examine the environment in 
which the negotiations are taking place. The international economic 
community and international human rights communities can not dis-
cern the limits of their present day scope and reach, much less their 
future. They interact in a space not facilitated or regulated by any 
177 One should note here that the remainder of the discussion further illustrates what 
Robert O. Keohane describes as "harmony;" the situation in which two international 
communities' "policies (pursued without regard for the interests of others) are regarded 
... as facilitating the attainment" of each community's goals. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER 
HEGEMONY 53 (1984). 
178Id. 
179 The failed MAl and the criticism that surrounded it illustrate this type of inter-
change. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. The rights that the MAl aimed to en-
force, as was discussed above, directly impacted upon pre-established universal human 
rights. However, aware of the existence of human rights doctrine, especially in light of the 
NAFTA and GATT negotiations, the OECD attempted to conduct the negotiation for the 
MAl without regard for the conflicts between international economic and international 
human rights law that it would create. Unwilling to negotiate directly with human rights 
institutions or NGOs, however, the mutinous MAl would have created a site of unresolved 
discord between the human rights community and the economic community. The result-
ing conflict, in fact, lead to the death of the MAl. Another, now infamous, example lies in 
the 1999 anti-globalization protests and those that have subsequently ensued. 
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governmental superstructure. Finally, the only potential resistors of 
their interactions are the sovereign nations affected by the outcomes 
of the interchange. Thus the obstacle to determining and implement-
ing results that promote and protect human rights will be the ability 
to convince nations that, on balance and over time, the results serve 
their interests. 
The 1990s were an era of renewed and in tense in terest in foreign 
direct investment. The human rights community, witnessing this activ-
ity, derived two conclusions. First, it concluded that TNC's and inves-
tors have a responsibility not to allow degradation of the environment 
and abuse of the labor force to be considered tools for pro fi t-
maximization. This conclusion fueled desires to implement codes of 
conduct regulating the actions of transnational corporations.l80 Sec-
ond, as evidenced herein, as the desire to attract foreign capital and 
investment experiences ebbed and more countries were willing to 
sign treaties like the GATT, human rights groups saw the excitement 
over neo-liberal economics as an opportunity to form ties with the 
global economic actors and, thereby, to advance human rights. 
Using international financial institutions, human rights advocates 
hope to convince countries that have thus far resisted pressure to ac-
cept the legitimacy of liberal human rights to do so in concurrence 
with western liberal economic models, or rather, to adopt liberalism 
as a complete rather than as a bifurcated or partial package. Addi-
tionally, those countries that already have acquiesced to the liberal 
economic model may be able to use financial institutions to 
strengthen the pressure to observe and enforce human rights. If hu-
man rights or scrutiny over "social issues"181 are included as part of 
the package of WTO, IMF, or World Bank membership, both of these 
objectives will be furthered. Perhaps, if the benefit to a given country 
of the liberal economic model is viewed as indisputable and sizable, 
180 One should note that codes of conduct may have limited effect. For example, a re-
cent report shows that even though Nike has implemented a code of conduct, it never 
posted a code of conduct on the premises of any of its Jakartan facilities, the workers had 
never heard of a code of conduct, the terms of the code of conduct were never imple-
mented, and the code was commonly violated. See Nike Sweatshop Suit (Nafl Public Radio 
broadcast, Apr. 21, 1998) (on file with author); Jennifer Lin, Anti-Nike Backlash Growing over 
Worker-Abuse Reports, THE FLORIDA TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville), Apr. 4, 1998, at Al (de-
scribing instances of worker abuse in Nike factories in Vietnam and South Korea). 
18l The discussion herein of the IMF decision to examine social issues in connection 
with its involvement in particular countries demonstrates that countries may be willing to 
submit to examination and scrutiny of their domestic human rights practices in order to 
access IMF funds. There have been no instances in which a country decided not to use 
IMF funds because of this new policy. 
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the cost of succumbing to human rights and enforcement thereof will 
seem diminished in comparison. 
This thought process has led human rights institutions and or-
ganizations to pressure the international economic community to in-
tegrate human rights into their activities. While it is notable that this 
pressure results in various cooperative efforts between these two 
communities, it should not be surprising. Both traditions emerged in 
part from liberal ideology, and both sets of institutions aspired to cre-
ate a stable and peaceful world order.182 Further, architects of both 
systems believed that multilateral bodies are central to addressing 
global problems. In order to legitimate their claims to universality, 
both communities seek to persuade all sovereign nations that their 
models for addressing global problems are meritorious. Additionally, 
founders of the Bretton Woods System recognize that "a growing 
number of economic, environmental, and social problems are beyond 
the ability of the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT to manage. "183 
Accordingly, they have commenced an inquiry on how these institu-
tions can respond to such problems.l84 
One must also consider the similar attributes of the individuals 
who make up both of these communities. Most have received exten-
sive education-many of them in the same educational facilities in 
London, Oxford, Cambridge, New York, or Washington-during 
which these individuals confirmed their membership in a cosmopoli-
tan class.l85 These common experiences simplifY encounters by dimin-
ishing fundamental issues, such as the national language in which dis-
cussions will be conducted and the rules of professional and social 
conduct to be observed with one another. These commonalties possi-
bly have assisted the human rights community in persuading their 
economic counterparts to enter negotiations and in implementing 
the outcomes of such negotiations. 
182 See, e.g., Margaret Garritson de Vries, The Bretton Woods Conference and the Birth of the 
International Monetary Fund, in BRETrON WOODS, supra note 28, at 4 (stating that officials in 
the U.S. State Department in the early 1940s, convinced that "economics had been the 
missing ingredient in the failed League of Nations' efforts to secure world peace, were 
thinking in terms ofa liberal international trade regime after the war"). 
18!1 BRETrON WOODS, supra note 28, at vii. 
184 See id. 
185 For examples of this experience see Al'PADURAI, supra note 175, at 1-23, 48-65. It is 
also significant that English has been accepted overwhelmingly as the diplomatic national 
language of this cosmopolitan class. For example, 96 members of the GATT conduct their 
work in English alone. COULMAS, supra note 5, at 188. 
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The ability to compromise about the subjects and areas for nego-
tiation has also been important in convincing the international eco-
nomic domain to interact with the human rights community. Codes of 
conduct, IMF PRSPs, a human rights office at the VVTO, and the im-
portance of the poor and underrepresented assume the continued 
existence and vigor of the economic domain. This assumption has 
created a space for financial institutions to permit human rights to 
enter their fields without formally conceding their own set of bundled 
sovereignty rights, which they would prefer to maintain. Successful 
proposals for interaction between these two entities likely will further 
human rights interests while assuring international financial actors 
that this will not result in their own loss of autonomy or importance in 
world affairs. 
There is one final characteristic of the individuals who make up 
these two particular legal communities. As lawyers, these individuals 
are likely to be extremely focused on the importance and potency of 
words. l86 They belong to a profession that passionately haggles over 
meanings of individual words in order to arrive at a definition most 
favorable to the client or to the interest they serve. l87 Further, as in-
ternational lawyers, most of them have experienced the power of lan-
guage when they have either been empowered or marginalized in 
conversations, depending on their ability to speak various national 
languages. 
One should not underestimate the language-creating capacity 
and experience of both societies. For example, many of the nouns 
used in this essay-nouns as important and obvious as VVTO, NAFTA, 
GATT, IMF, World Bank, ICESCR, ICCPR, and UDHR-were created 
and have entered into use since 1940. These communities also con-
tinue to adopt verbs and vest them with specific meanings that refer-
ence their particular activities. One such verb that will be addressed 
below is "consult," though there are others like "coordinate," "ex-
haust" (domestic remedies), "intervene," and "adjust" each of which 
have very specific definitions in particular contexts. Among people 
who are formally trained or at least exposed to the importance of ne-
gotiation and "getting to yes,"l88 the points of encounter of these 
186 LAKOFF, supra note 4, at 12. 
187 See, e.g., Chuang, supra note 3, at 73, 80-90 (discussing definitional issues regarding 
the classification of forced labor and trafficking practices). 
188 Each year, over 100 people are trained at Harvard Law School alone in a negotia-
tion seminar that teaches the negotiation models proposed in ROGER FISHER, GETTING TO 
YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed. 1991). While it is not clear 
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communities will be heavily centered on negotiations regarding the 
promulgation and definition of the language that will define future 
cooperation between them. 
C. The Nexus of Different Languages for Special Purposes 
At the nexus of these two very different languages for special 
purposes-one focused on rights, the other on economic activity-
grows a new language for the purpose of integrating human rights 
and international economic policies.189 
If one envisions languages as tools that serve particular needs, 
and further assumes that the users of such tools will choose language 
suitable to their specialized purposes, it is natural to conclude that, as 
communicative needs evolve, so must the languages used by their 
speakers.190 In the context of the nexus shaping between interna-
tional human rights and economic actors, there is evidence of this 
evolution. The resulting language will likely be an amalgam of the two 
original languages, which is better adapted to its purpose.191 Linguists 
have developed the terms "pidgin," "Creole," "lingua franca," and 
"vehicular language" in order to explain the new languages that 
emerged from traditional colonial era encounters.192 Largely referred 
that it is one of the purposes of such workshops and of the book. the effect is that many of 
the world's most educated and able negotiators are educated on the same methods and 
rules of negotiation and share a common idea of what form such negotiations should take, 
It is also relevant that this book is translated into many languages, providing this method-
ology to negotiators without English skills in a large portion of the world. 
lB9 SeeCouLMAS, supra note 5, at 154-66. 
190 Id. at 154. 
191 Examples of this result have already surfaced and will be discussed below. 
192 ANTHONY & GATES, supra note 6, at 520; COULMAS, supra note 5, at 157; STEVEN 
PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT: How THE MIND CREATES LANGUAGE 33 (1995). In or-
der to facilitate the following discussion, readers should understand the definition of the 
following terms: Pidgin: A simplified speech used for communication between people of 
different languages. The linguistic variation known as " pidgin" develops in areas where 
intense social intercourse between members of drastically different cultures takes place. 
Pidgin, which develops out of this linguistic heterogeneity, is a simplified system of com-
munication. The maturation of pidgin and its adoption by subsequent generations results 
in a creolization of the language. Mari]. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiserimina-
tion Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction 100 YALE LJ. 1329, 1342 n.49 (1991). 
Creole: a language based on two or more languages that serves as the native language of its 
speakers; a creole language emerges when new students of a pidgin language do not have 
access to the languages that originally formed the pidgin language and therefore learn the 
pidgin language as an integral language. Creoles are sophisticated variations of pidgin with 
increased vocabulary and grammatical devices and are considered normal languages by 
sociolinguists. PINKER, supra, at 33; Matsuda, supra, at 1342-43. Lingua Franca: Any of vari-
ous languages used as common or commercial tongues among peoples of diverse speech; 
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to as "trade languages" because of their colonial history, pidgin lan-
guages are the first to develop at locations of exchange after initial 
unstable jargon becomes insufficient.193 
The language emerging from international economic and hu-
man rights encounters can be analogized to the pidgin language for-
mation of the colonization era. These common forms of language ad-
aptation arose from "situations of social pressure and inequality"194 
and were typically despised for lacking the "prestige of a literary tradi-
tion and socially respected speakers. "195 Thus, the language emerging 
from the nexus of these two communities matches the characteristics 
of a pidgin language with the possible exception of the social respect 
that its speakers enjoy.196 Nonetheless, the analogy is at least func-
tional in every other respect. Both the human rights and the interna-
tional economic communities feel pressure to interact in order to fur-
ther their own aims. Additionally, these two international law domains 
are unequal in popularity and enforceability.197 Finally, the pidgin 
language emerging from the interaction of these two communities 
will be influenced by, but independent of, the literary tradition of ei-
ther international economic law or human rights. 198 
something resembling a common language. Vehicular Language: In its broader definition, 
this term can be used synonymously with lingua franca. COULMAS, supra note 5, at 190 
(citing William J. Samarin, Lingua Francas of the World, in J.A. FISHERMAN, READINGS IN TIlE 
SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 661 (1968)). 
193 COULMAS, supra note 5, at 161-62; PINKER, supra note 192, at 33-34. 
194 COULMAS, supra note 5, at 158-59. 
195 Id. at 159. 
196 VVhile it is true that the individuals forging links between these two communities 
are highly scrutinized by their colleagues, there is no evidence that they are generally dis-
respected within their own fields. 
197 For another articulation of this inequality, see David Kennedy, Receiving the Interna-
tional, 10 CONN.]. INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (1994). 
198 It is interesting and important to note that pidgin languages and linguas franca are 
not a phenomenon only of historical economic activity between people of different ori-
gins. There is evidence that for many leaders of economic policy from non-English- speak-
ing nations, the ability to communicate at some level of proficiency was essential in an 
economic world order dominated by English. Victor L. Urquidi, one of the primary Mexi-
can representatives at the Bretton Woods Conference writes: 
Because my English was better than Cosio-Villegas's, though far from entirely 
correct (English, by the way, was the only official working language and no 
simultaneous interpretation was available), I had drafted [a statement on the 
reorientation of the IMF and World Bank goals to include development 
rather than only reconstruction] myself and read it out loud. 
Urquidi, supra note 18, at 42. 
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Thus far, the language that has emerged from the points of con-
tact illustrates the tendencies of language formation between these 
two communities and the resulting power balances. "Consult" is one 
illustrative word, together with its variations. Human rights and inter-
national economic advocates alike, since the creation of their respec-
tive institutions, have used consultation as the method to connect with 
nation-states. Both have defined consultation similarly and use this 
activity to understand state practices and influence their policies. 
Agreement over this word enabled the World Bank to consent to con-
sult with human rights nongovernmental organizations as one of the 
first formal cooperative breakthroughs between these communities. l99 
Consultation was identified as an activity that did not require negotia-
tion over the definition itself, and in which both communities have 
extensive experience and facility. 
Perhaps more interesting is the development of new words or 
word meanings previously not used by either community. For an ex-
ample of language creation, the IMF case is helpful. While the IMF 
has been slow to make public statements about its responsibility vis a 
vis human rights, it has promulgated a formal statement about the 
"social dimensions" of its work.20o In this statement, the IMF recog-
nizes that it "has major implications for the three core issues of the 
World Summit on Social Development (WSSD)-poverty alleviation, 
promotion of employment, and social integration.''201 
Social integration-as defined in U.N. documents for the Social 
Summit-concerns the ability of different groups in society to live to-
gether in productive and cooperative harmony and to accommodate 
differences within a framework of common interest to the benefit of 
all. Social integration implies justice for the individual and harmony 
among different social groups and countries. It means integration of 
disadvantaged and vulnerable groups by making all institutions of so-
ciety more accessible to them.202 The IMF recognizes that "vulnerable 
199 See discussion of World Bank-NGO consultation supra Part II. 
200 See discussion on IMF consideration of social issues infra note 163-165, and ac-
companying text. As economic and social developments are mutually reinforcing, these 
policies are essential for reducing poverty and engendering social integration in the me-
dium term. At the same time, the IMF also recognizes the importance of sound social poli-
cies aimed directly at achieving social objectives. Increased attention to these aspects of the 
IMF's work would serve to enhance the political sustainability of economic reforms. 
201 IMF POLICY DIALOGUE, supra note 129, at 3. 
202 See UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL AsSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE WORLD SUMMIT FOR SO-
CIAL DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.166/9 (1995), available at http://www.un.org/ doc-
uments/ga/ confl66/aconfl66-9.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2001). 
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groups need to be protected through well-targeted social safety nets" 
and that IMF-supported programs should improve access to social 
services, including primary education and health.203 
The list of IMF "social issues"-poverty alleviation; employment; 
social accommodation for disadvantaged individuals and groups; and 
access to public service including health and education programs-
roughly corresponds to rights found in the ICCPR and ICESCR. 
Poverty alleviation evokes the right to an adequate standard of living, 
including food, clothing, and housing. These are rights protected by 
nearly all of the ICESCR. The right to employment corresponds 
specifically to Article 6 of the same document that protects the right 
to work. Similarly, the created term "social integration"204 and its 
officially promulgated definition correspond to a number of rights 
enumerated in both the ICESCR and ICCPR, including the right to 
self-determination, 205 the right to be free from discrimination,206 and 
the right to social involvement in society.207 Finally, the rights of access 
to public services, including health care and schooling, are also pro-
tected in the ICESCR. 
Instead of recognizing and citing these rights as the foundation 
for the "social dimensions" of its work, the IMF currently distances 
itself from human rights norms and documents by using ambiguous 
language that loses the moral imperative and the legal efficacy of the 
rights enumerated by foundational human rights documents. 
It is encouraging that the IMF has made the step of at least in-
corporating "social issues." It is important to note, however, the nega-
tive implications of allowing an international institution to invent lan-
guage when it does not fully address the human rights problems to 
which it claims to be attentive; it potentially could both demote the 
legal potency as well as obfuscate the global familiarity that human 
rights language has attained. It is important to retain the character of 
a particular human right as a right, rather than allowing it to be 
framed as a "social issue." One international legal scholar explains 
that "characterization of a specific goal as a human right elevates it 
above the rank and file of competing societal goals, gives it a degree 
19. 
203 IMF POLICY DIALOGUE, supra note 129, at 2. 
204 [d. at 3 n.I. 
205 ICESCR, supra note 84, at art. 1; ICCPR, supra note 84, at art. 1. 
206 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 84, at arts. 1,2, 25; ICESCR, supra note 84, at arts. 18, 
207 This right is protected by a number of the provisions of both the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR. 
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of immunity from challenge, and generally endows it with an aura of 
timelessness, absoluteness and universal validity. "208 
Arguably the entire discussion of sustainable development and 
the alleviation of poverty is evidence of the continued interaction of 
these two communities, the first rhetorical and substantive fruit of 
their cooperation with one another. It is notable that joint publica-
tions such as A Better World for All have been framed entirely in this 
language of poverty alleviation and attention to the world's least privi-
leged people. A trend that seems to be emerging in these joint docu-
ments is common reference to a particular topic of human concern as 
a social issue rather than as a human right. These are all hints of an 
emerging Pidgin language. 
Each new linguistic development between the two communities 
is, at the very least, a limited success in the attempt of the human 
rights community to enter into the daily operations of its economic 
counterparts. It is not possible to discern with any degree of certainty 
whether this emerging pidgin language and the rights that it protects 
is, on balance, emerging as weighted more heavily in favor of rights or 
the economic domain. Nonetheless, the original political inequality of 
the two worlds exposes the imperative of maintaining strong human 
rights language in the negotiation over substantive institutional 
change. 
The language that is born from the negotiations between the in-
ternational economic and human rights domains is substantively im-
portant. If the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's 
unconcealed reference to human rights in its statute209 is a substantive 
victory, then it follows that the IMF's reluctance to use this term, by 
inventing the terms "social issues," "social dimensions," or "social in-
tegration," and the wro's disinclination to even mention "social is-
sues", falls short of this mark. 
As a language is learned-and certainly as it is invented-it can 
limit the possibilities for substan tive critique of a particular paradigm. 
Carol Cohn explains, "learning [a] language is a transforrnative, 
rather than an additive, process. When you choose to learn it you en-
ter a new mode of thinking. "210 She illustrates that the language in 
208 Philip Alston, Making SPace for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development, 
1 HARv. HUM. Rrs. Y.B. 3, 3 (1988). 
209 Sirgun I. Skogly, Book Review: Human Rights in the New Europe: Problems and Progress, 
89 AJ. INT'L. L. 242, 244 (1995). 
210 Carol Cohn, Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals, 12 SIGNS 687, 
716 (1987). 
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which a profession is framed has the effect of transforming the entire 
field and the individuals who participate therein. As a feminist and a 
peace-loving person, Cohn entered a year long program in which she 
was immersed in the world of defense intellectuals.21l During the pro-
cess of learning the specialized language of military strategy, she 
found that she could not use that language to express her concerns 
about militarization generally or about the sexism inherent in that 
language. For example, she explains, "the word 'peace' is not a part of 
this discourse. As close as one can come is 'strategic stability. "'212 Im-
mersed in the accepted discourse of the military community, she 
found it difficult to maintain the legitimacy of her convictions even 
within the safety of her own head.213 
The encounters between the economic and human rights com-
munities occur through the participation of the individuals who work 
or advocate within each of those communities. Their commonalties 
and sustained contact with one another hold risks for the advance-
ment of human rights. Cohn's description of the totalizing effects of 
language modification, the ability of language modification to limit 
alternative avenues for social change, as well as its capacity to alter the 
substance of discourse and even the participants therein, suggest that 
in order to sustain the rhetorical power of rights language and the 
substance it carries with it, human rights advocates negotiating with 
their economics-focused counterparts must consciously retain the 
language of rights. Further, they must adamantly oppose language 
that demotes human rights from their elevated status as rights to that 
of "issues." This is important for the negotiations and discourse itself, 
and essential in the language used to describe any outcomes from the 
encounters in the form of statements, agreements, or treaties. 
The compelling quality of human rights rhetoric has been a cor-
nerstone of the argument that the international economic domain 
has a responsibility to incorporate human rights considerations into 
all its activities. The aspirations set out in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and its progeny have the ability to move the imagina-
tion. This quality also has induced a wide range of communities and 
interest groups to use the human rights system for their own protec-
tion. Since the creation of the UDHR, human rights law has gained 
such popularity and achieved such status that nearly every modern 
211 [d. at 688. 
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cause has sought to use the language of human rights to give it 
greater validity.214 
When human rights advocates participate in negotiations with 
the international economic community, they represent all individuals 
who use the universal and regional mechanisms for human rights. 
Language compromises in these encounters may have a detrimental 
effect on the individuals who depend on the human rights system's 
protections when negotiations yield insufficient results. Negative out-
comes immediately effect the ability to advance human rights through 
economic instruments. But the negative consequences do not stop 
there. 
Language compromises have the effect of dominating the field of 
interaction between the human rights domain and the international 
economic domain with formal statements, agreements, or treaties that 
effectively take the form of precedents for future interactions. As 
such, these compromises may eliminate potential future actions on a 
particular problem. For example, maintaining a language that 
imperatively states that indigenous peoples have a right to self-
determination and the right to control their own territory is a far 
stronger protection for indigenous peoples than language that sug-
gests that the interests of indigenous peoples will be balanced against 
those of an economic actor wanting to make use of land traditionally 
occupied by indigenous peoples. These two options roughly model 
the protections declared by ILO Convention 107 and the relocation 
policies of the World Bank, respectively. The cost/benefit method 
employed in the second example, if widely adopted as a method for 
dealing with the issue of indigenous people's land rights, could have 
repercussions far beyond the specific example of the World Bank's 
compromise on the issue. It establishes a model and precedent for the 
future interaction of economic and social considerations that uses 
solely economic language, foreclosing the powerful rhetoric of the 
rights at the foundation of "social considerations" and "social issues." 
Another example lies in the model of the international environ-
mental movement. This model is now so economics based, that coun-
tries may soon be able to purchase and sell pollution rights on trading 
floors. It provides a good example of the defeats inherent in adopting 
economic language for the protection of what was previously imag-
ined as an absolute right. While such a trading system may advance 
the goals of reducing overall carbon-dioxide emissions, it also margi-
214 Howse & Mutua, supra note 7, 1 3. 
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nalizes the morally-based idea that humans over-consume, and that 
their over-consumption is inherently bad for the planet. It also virtu-
ally eliminates the utopian vision of a world without pollution. Creat-
ing a permanent and legitimate market for pollution certainly has the 
global effect of marginalizing the idealistic language of environmental 
rights. This example argues for avoiding this model of language adap-
tation while inventing the mechanisms for the international economic 
community and the human rights community to cooperate. It also 
demonstrates the human rights community's primary responsibility to 
maintain and advance the strength of the individuals it aims to pro-
tect. 
CONCLUSION 
Our reconstructive task is a task of creating compelling alternative visions 
of possible futures, a task of recognizing and developing alternative concep-
tions of rationality, a task of creating rich and imaginative alternative 
voices-diverse voices whose conversations with each other will invent those 
futures. 215 
At this early stage of interactions between international human 
rights advocates and international economic actors, the task for hu-
man rights advocates at the points of contact discussed in Part III is to 
retain the compelling and utopian language of rights. As alternative 
language such as that evidenced by the creation of terms such as "so-
cial issues,» "social concerns," and "social integration" has clearly 
started to emerge from these contacts, rights advocates should care-
fully consider the implications of compromising intact human rights 
language. 
Rights negotiators can more successfully maintain a strong rights-
based language if they are conscious of the implications of conceding 
to new language that is overly dominated by economic rhetoric and 
tools, as has occurred in the encounter between the international 
economic and international environmental entities. To maintain the 
full impact of the utopian vision of the human rights system, it is bet-
ter to employ imagination than to concede to what is simply the best 
among pre-existing options. In this way, rights negotiators can arrive 
at what is truly best for the advancement of human rights. The lan-
guage that emerges from this imaginative effort will be the language 
215 Cohn, supra note 210, at 718. 
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that connects the two domains and determines how international 
economic institutions and actors will integrate, protect, and enforce 
human rights. It will also determine which rights they will allow to 
influence their activities. 
It is essential to retain a "plain language" with respect to human 
rights. As advocates of the plain language movement have noted, the 
purpose of drafting in plain language is to enhance democracy and 
the rule of law, by ensuring it is accessible to all people and that all 
people understand that the language applies to them.216 Given that 
human rights have attained a high level of universal institutional, gov-
ernmental, and popular familiarity, maintaining a clear human rights 
language is essential. The imperative of using clear language is espe-
cially strong in the context of human rights, where violations of estab-
lished law and standards results in violations of human dignity. The 
language of human rights, in order to be understood by those it aims 
to protect, must, above all, be intelligible and accessible.217 
As pidgin languages mature and are adopted by future genera-
tions as their own native tongues, they are termed "Creole" languages. 
One characteristic of Creole languages is the totalizing effect they 
have on the new generation that knows neither of the original lan-
guages from which the pidgin language emerged. The rapid forma-
tion of international economic language, international human rights 
language, and the pidgin language they are forming in their contact 
with one another suggests that both communities have a capacity for 
rapid creation and transmutation of language. Accordingly, the future 
Creole generation that will barely remember an era in which these 
two communities did not cooperate is already rising. In considering 
these future generations, human rights advocates and negotiators 
have a responsibility to advance a language that retains real as well as 
rhetorical potency in order to sustain the potential for utopian imagi-
nation so traditionally inherent in the human rights movement. 
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